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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past few years, the United States has witnessed the largest redeployment of 
charitable assets in the Anglo-American world since Henry VII closed the monasteries in 
1536-1540 as formerly nonprofit health care providers are switching to for-profit status. 
Conversions refer to a growing array of transactions that have in common the transfor- 
mation of the core enterprise from a charitable undertaking to a for-profit venture. Bil- 
lions of dollars in charitable assets have been redeployed from eleemosynary to profit- 
seeking purposes, leading to a fundamental change in the structure of the American 
health care system. The conversion of charitable health providers has created some of the 
nation's largest private f0undations.l 
This essay does not address the truly important policy issues: whether for-profit 
healthcare should be allowed or en~ouraged;~ how the quality of care compares to non- 
profits or what criteria should be used to evaluate the quality of care;3 or what the impact 
of these conversions is on the communities they serve.4 It discusses less significant is- 
sues: those of process-how can we shape and control this tidal wave of change so that 
the public will be served and charitable assets preserved to the maximum extent possible? 
The focus is upon the valuation of these charitable assets; the appropriate process of con- 
* James D. Hopkins Professor, Pace Law School. A.B., A.M. University of Pennsylvania, J.D., Ph.D. 
New York University. 
1. An estimated ninety foundations with total assets of $9.3 billion have been created from health care 
conversions; the median asset size is $57 million. See Harris Meyer, A Lot is Not Enough; For Foundations 
Spun Off by Hospital Sales, Even Billions Go Only So Far, 7 1 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS 30,30 (1997). 
2. See generally David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. 
COW. L. 741 (1998); Malik M. Hasan, Letf End the Nonprofit Charade, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1055 (1996). 
3. See John Copeland, Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Hospitals, 18 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 35 (1997) 
(comparing "(1) the charitable care provided by hvo categories versus taxes forgiven or paid; (2) hospital 
costs by type of hospital; and (3) hospital as a 'community institution"'); see also Gary 1. Young et al., Does 
the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the Poor, HEALTH Am., Jan-Feb 1997, at 137 
(examining "how the acquisition of nonprofit hospitals by investor-owned corporations affects acquired hos- 
pitals' provision of uncompensated care"). 
4. For a discussion of the public policy issues, see Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit 
Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFF. Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9; Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and 
Hospitals: What's at Stake?, HEALTH AFF. Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 29 (discussing the public policy issues). 
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version; how to protect the public; who should represent the public interest; and what, if 
any, should be the legal response. 
A. Section 501(c)(3) Organizations: "Traditional Nonprofirs " 
There is a vast array of organizations in the United States that share the designation 
"nonprofit." Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides twenty-seven different 
organizational categories which exempt an organization from federal income t a x a t i ~ n . ~  
These categories of tax exempt organizations include corporations, title holding compa- 
nies, civic leagues, local associations of employees, business leagues, social clubs, and 
organizations operated for religious, charitable, educational and similar purposes. 
Over half of the 1.2 million charities registered with the Internal Revenue Service 
are covered by section 501(c)(3) which consists of traditional ~har i t i es .~  The tax code 
states that these traditional charities must be organized and operated exclusively for re- 
ligious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational  purpose^.^ No part of their net earn- 
ings can inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial 
part of their activities can include carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to in- 
fluence ~e~ i s l a t i on .~  These traditional charities may not participate or intervene in politi- 
cal  campaign^.^ Recognition as a 501(c)(3) charity is very valuable to organizations, be- 
cause contributions to such charities are deductible by the donor from their personal or 
corporate income.'o 
B. The Promotion of Health as a Tax Exempt Purpose 
From the time of the Elizabethan Statute of uses," the promotion of health has 
been considered a charitable purpose, and in the United States, hospitals and other health 
care providers have always been tax exempt.12 Non-profit hospitals seemed so much the 
symbol of charitable purpose that many states specifically granted them exemption from 
taxation.13 In the eighteenth century, the nonprofit hospital was often little more than an 
5 .  See I.R.C. $5 501(c)(I)-(27), 501(d), 501(e), 501(f), 5Ol(k) (Supp. 1997). 
6. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated exclu- 
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational pur- 
poses, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention 
of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. . . and which does not partici- 
pate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of any. . . candidate for public of- 
fice. 
7 .  See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
lo. See I.R.C. 5 170 (1997). 
11. 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601). 
12. Trusts for the promotion of health are charitable and have been upheld as such even when the bene- 
fits were not exclusively limited to the poor. See 1V.A WILLIAM R. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS 5 372 (4th 
ed. 1989). 
13. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a 
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almshouse where the homeless came to die.14 During the nineteenth century, nonprofit 
hospitals were known as "voluntary" institutions-organized by religious societies, 
heavily hnded by donations, and staffed by doctors who worked without compensation, 
and nurses who worked for room and board as part of their lifetime commitment to a re- 
ligious order devoted to caring for the poor.15 
Through medical advances, changes in the payment system which made the 
"voluntary" nature of the hospital a myth, and the emergence of for-profit competition, 
hospitals retained their tax exempt status. However, the Internal Revenue Service's ra- 
tionale for such status changed. Originally, the Treasury coupled exemption of health 
care providers with charitable care to the underprivileged even though such providers re- 
ceived substantial income from paying patients.16 If a hospital provided care to indigent 
patients to the extent of its financial ability, it would be considered an exempt entity.17 
After mid-century, the voluntary nature of nonprofit hospitals eroded and came to 
resemble more closely their proprietary counterparts as third party payors, primarily 
Medicare and Medicaid, constituted the overwhelming source of revenues. In response to 
urgings of the hospital industry to eliminate the charity care requirement, in 1969 the In- 
ternal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 69-54518 which adopted a "per se" rule 
of hospital exemption: an entity engaged in the promotion of health for the benefit of the 
community who pursued a charitable purpose was tax exempt, even though a portion of 
the community, such as indigents, was excluded from participation.19 Under this stan- 
dard, some health maintenance organizations could be found eligible for section 
501(c)(3) status?O Although the rationale for the continuation of nonprofit hospitals' tax 
exempt status has been a subject of academic criticism and state court developments, the 
exemption remains? 
Donative Theory of Tax Eremption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 3 18 11.33 (1991) (collecting authorities from many 
states). 
14. See Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofir Hospital, 32 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 1015, 1021 (1988). 
15. Hall & Colombo, supra note 13, at 318. 
16. See M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable Eremp- 
tion, 80 MMN. L. REV. 299,305 (1995). 
17. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202,203. 
18. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 1 17. 
19. See id. at 118. One of the examples used in this Revenue Ruling was that a tax exempt hospital must 
maintain an emergency room open to all persons regardless of that person's ability to pay. However, in a later 
ruling, the Service ruled that specialized hospitals (such as eye and cancer hospitals) qualified for section 
501(c)(3) status despite the lack of an emergency room if other "significant factors" evidenced the hospitals' 
commitment to community health care. See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. These significant factors in- 
cluded the existence of a broad based board of directors, an open medical staff policy, and treatment of Medi- 
care and Medicaid patients. See id. at 95. 
20. See Sound Health Assoc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 158, 191 (1978) (stating that a health maintenance or- 
ganization which provided health care services to members on a fee paid basis and to nonmembers on a fee- 
for-service basis, handled emergency cases without regard to membership status and provided free care and 
reduced rate care to a limited number of indigent patients qualified as a charitable organization serving the 
public interest as described in I.R.C. 5 501(c)(3)). 
21. For scholarly criticisms, see generally Bloche, supra note 16; Hall & Columbo, supra note 13; Rob- 
ert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Indushy, 93 HARV. L. REV. 14 16 (1980); John D. 
Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Eremption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
215 (1994); Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. SchafTer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, the Internal 
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Nonprofit organizations may outlive their purposes or utility to society. Declining 
membership or financial difficulties may threaten survival. In order to obtain exemption 
under section 501(c)(3), the nonprofit's articles of association must state that upon dis- 
solution, the organization's assets are to be distributed for one or more exempt purposes, 
to a governmental body for a public purpose.22 Such assets may also be distributed by a 
court to another organization to be used in a manner that in the judgment of the court will 
best accomplish the general purposes for which the dissolved organization was formed.23 
This "organizational test" is not met if the articles or applicable state law provide that 
the organization's assets upon dissolution would be distributed to its members or share- 
h o l d e r ~ . ~ ~  
Under state corporate law the general rule is that public charities must transfer their 
assets on dissolution for charitable or similar while mutual benefit organizations 
may distribute their assets to members upon dissolution or in accordance with such other 
plan provided by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws26 
Although the procedures differ depending upon the jurisdiction, the process of dis- 
solution typically involves a resolution by the board of directors and a plan of dissolu- 
tion, which must be approved by an appropriate vote of the membership (typically two- 
- 
Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J .  HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 251 (1991). For developments concerning 
the denial of state and local tax exemptions, see generally Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985); Robert J. Hannen, Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue to Receive a Charitable 
Organization Tar Exemption Under Pennsylvania Law?, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 727 (1990); see also Janne G. Gal- 
lagher, When Local Governments Come Calling: The Movement to Tar Charities, 18 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 
25 (1997). 
22. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(~)(3)-l(b)(4) (as amended in 1990). 
23. See id. 
24. However, even if the charter is not explicit, the test is met if state law requires that the organization's 
assets must be dedicated to a charitable purpose on dissolution. See Rev Proc. 82-2, 1982-1 C.B. 367 contains 
a list of states that provide for the distribution of a nonprofit's assets by operation of law in a manner that sat- 
isfies the organizational test requirement. 
25. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT 5 14.06(6) (1988) (stating that "a public benefit 
or religious corporation [shall transfer] its assets: (i) to one or more persons described in section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) if the dissolved corporation is not described in section 501(c)(3), to one or 
more public benefit or religious corporations"); CAL. COW. CODE 5 5410 (West 1997) (stating that no corpo- 
ration shall make any distribution); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. L. 5 1005(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 1997) 
("Assets received and held by the corporation for a purpose specified as Type B...shall be distributed to one or 
more domestic or foreign corporations or other organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to 
those of the dissolved corporation...."). See generally In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society, 257 P.2d I 
(Cal. 1953); In re Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986). 
26. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT 5 14.06(7) (1988); CAL. COW. CODE 5 8717(b) 
(West 1990) (stating that "[ilf the articles or bylaws do not provide the manner of disposition, the assets shall 
be distributed among the members in accordance with their respective rights therein"); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
L. 8 1005(a)(3)(B). Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois and Oregon, have based their dissolution provisions on 
section 46(c) of the original Model Nonprofit Act, which has been criticized for placing "no meaningful re- 
strictions on distributions in dissolution beyond the ambiguous requirement that 'assets held by the corpora- 
tion subject to limitations permitting their use only for charitable . . . or similar purposes' must be transferred 
to other organizations 'engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation."' 
Henry Hansmann, Relorming Nonprojit Corporation Low, 129 U .  PA. L. REV. 497, 575-579 (1981); see also 
805 111. Comp. Stat 105l112.16 (1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. 5 61.530 (1997). 
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thirds of votes cast). In corporations without members, the board will adopt the dissolu- 
tion plan by resolution. Dissolution requires notice to creditors and involves payment of 
liabilities and distribution of remaining assets. If the organization is a public charity the 
plan will specify the distributees. In those cases the attorney general is notified and the 
plan is submitted to a court for approval. This is often a perfunctory review, as the attor- 
ney general is overworked unless there is a particular public interest involved or the or- 
ganization is notorious. If a regulatory agency has approved the formation of the organi- 
zation, it will be notified and must approve the dissolution. Mutual benefit corporations 
are subject to less supervision by the attorney general than public benefit corporations. 
Upon the dissolution of a mutual benefit corporation, the assets remaining after creditors 
have been paid normally will be distributed to the members.27 
In determining whether to approve a plan of distribution proposed by a corpora- 
tion's board, a court may consider: (1) the source of the funds to be distributed, whether 
received through public subscription or under the trust provision of a will or other in- 
strument; (2) the purposes and powers of the corporation as enumerated in its certificate 
of incorporation; (3) the activities in fact carried out and services actually provided by 
the corporation; (4) the relationship of the activities and purposes of the proposed dis- 
tributee(s) to those of the dissolving corporation; and (5) the bases for the distribution 
recommended by the board.28 A certificate of dissolution is then filed with the secretary 
of state or appropriate state official.29 
The law is clear that when an organization is exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code, it must contribute its remaining assets to another 501(c)(3) organization. Nor- 
mally, the requirement to distribute assets to another exempt organization is not a prob- 
lem, because many nonprofits dissolve in an atmosphere of financial distress. Typically, 
when a nonprofit dissolves, little is contributed to other organizations as a lack of assets 
is the primary cause for most organizations' demise.30 In contrast, the assets at stake in 
hospital and HMO conversions are enormous, and their valuation and disposition are 
crucial elements in the transaction. Consider how the following example of the conver- 
sion of a California nonprofit health maintenance organization differed from the norm. 
27. See REV. MODEL NONPROFTT COW. Act Ch. 14; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L. Arts. 10-1 1; CAL. 
COW. CODE Ch. 15-16. 
28. Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d at 862. If the organization is a mutual benefit 
corporation, the plan of dissolution and distribution of assets must be submitted to a vote of the members. 
29. After dissolution, the corporation carries on no activities except winding up of its affairs, preserving 
and protecting assets, minimizing liabilities, discharging existing liabilities, disposing of properties that will 
not be distributed in kind, and paying liabilities and distributing corporate assets in accordance with the speci- 
fications of the dissolution plan. If the organization has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities, the court may 
appoint a receiver to preserve the assets. 
30. See generally WILLIAM G .  B O W  ET AL., THE CHARITABLE NONPROFTTS (1994). Bowen examined 
the differences between nonprofit and for-profit dissolutions. First, nonprofits are more likely to resist closure 
and simply hold on in the face of economic setbacks than for-profits, which may see economic and tax bene- 
fits in combinations or liquidations. Second, nonprofits with substantial assets are less likely to close than 
other nonprofits. See id. at 99:There may be greater pressures to keep nonprofits in existence than for profit- 
seeking entities. Thus, many nonprofits survive too long, drawing down their resources to finance annual defi- 
cits, or they stay alive on the basis of faded but still useful reputations. Boards may be embarrassed to close or 
to seek a merger with a stronger organization. See id. 
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Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) offer comprehensive primary health 
care through physicians who are employees or partners, or through arrangements with 
groups of physicians on a cost efficient basis to subscriber members on a prepaid fee 
contract.31 The Family Health Program (FHP) was founded in 1961 as a nonprofit HMO 
by Dr. Robert Gumbiner and offered prepaid medical and dental care through a network 
of 22 company-operated clinics in Southern California, Utah, and Guam as well as 
through contractual arrangements with physicians in Arizona and New Mexico. FHP re- 
ceived the benefits of tax exemption. Federal loans and grants then available to nonprofit 
HMOs enabled expansion. 
In February 1985, when it first applied for conversion to for-profit status, the board 
of directors valued its assets at approximately $13.5 million as of June 30, 1984. Gum- 
biner and seventeen other investors including other board members founded HMO 
Health Group, Inc. (HGI) as the for-profit purchaser of FHP's assets. Gumbiner owned 
50.5% of HGI. The California Department of Corporations rejected the $13.5 million 
figure and proposed $47 million as the fair market value. The Department and FHP then 
negotiated a $38.5 million price which included $7.2 million in cash, and the rest paid 
over ten years.32 
Another for-profit HMO, Maxicare Health Plans, made a competing offer to buy 
FHP for $50 million and sued to prevent HGI's conversion of FHP. Maxicare was joined 
by the California Attorney General who urged that FHP be required to accept the highest 
offer. At the time both the president of Maxicare and FHP's own documents indicated 
that FHP's fair market value might have been substantially higher. The court permitted 
the conversion to HGI holding that the law did not require sale to the highest bidder.33 A 
foundation was established to receive the money used to purchase the HMO. 
Eight months after the conversion, HGI floated an initial public offering of stock 
with a market value of $150 million. Approximately $25.3 million went to the for-profit 
HMO and just under $10.6 million went to the FHP Foundation, established as part of the 
c o n ~ e r s i o n . ~ ~  "The former managers, including Dr. Gumbiner, continued to hold a 
75.9% stake in the for-profit company worth $1 14 million."35 These assets belong to the 
31. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 437.03 (West 1990) (repealed 1995); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. 
5 333.20106(2) (West 1997); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5 4401(1) (McKinney 1997) (defining HMOs). 
32. See Michele Meldin & Jane Perkins, HMO Conversions: How to Disbibute the Charitable Assets, 21 
CLEARINGHOUSE R V. 467,468 (1987); Robert Hanley, Offering Puts FHP Corp's Value at Six Times Its Pur- 
chase Price, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1985 at Pt. 4, l ;  Jube Shiver, Jr., Judge Oks FHP's Buy-out Plan, Thwart- 
ing Maxicare, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1985 at Pt. 4, 1; State Suit Seeks G@ to Charity by FHP Oflcers, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1986 at Pt. 4, 1. 
33. See Maxicare Health Plans v. Gumbiner, No. C-565072 (Los Angeles Superior Courf 1986). 
34. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
104 (1995). 
35. Id. Nor is this the only example of executive largesse during a conversion. When HealthNet, now 
named Health Systems International, converted in 1992, thirty-three executives purchased twenty percent of 
the company for $1.5 million. Those shares were worth $3 15 in April 1996. The former CEO paid $30,000 for 
shares later worth $31 million. See Judith E. Bell, Saving Their Assets; How to Stop Plunder at Blue Cross 
and Other Nonprofits, AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-June 1996 at 60, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mag 
File (discussing how executives have made millions converting nonprofits). HGI has since been taken over by 
a larger firm further enriching its shareholders. There have been other troubling examples: a hospital sale was 
negotiated and consummated in less than four weeks; a health system fired twelve trustees of a local hospital 
after they voiced opposition to a proposed sale to a for-profit system; and there are several incidents where 
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public, not to a nonprofit's managers. Gumbiner & associates used the nonprofit form to 
receive private inurement. 
Conversions are neither new, nor are they confined to the health care field, despite 
the media attention and state regulatory focus on hospitals and HMOs. The category of 
charitable organizations susceptible to conversion is much broader. It includes virtually 
any exempt organization that provides products or services for which there is a signifi- 
cant market-such as nonprofit book publishers, nonprofit television stations, as well as 
tax exempt biotechnology research  institute^.^^ Health care conversions have occurred 
within HMOs, exempt hospitals acquired by proprietary enterprises, and spin-offs of 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance plan assets into taxable s~bs id ia r ies .~~  Conversions oc- 
curred among hospitals and HMOs for many years without attracting much a t t e n t i ~ n . ~ ~  
A. Hospitals 
Three ownership types of hospitals have long coexisted: public, charitable, and for- 
profit. Public hospitals are owned and operated by a governmental unit. Charitable hos- 
pitals, frequently termed "voluntary hospitals," originally were organized by religious 
societies, and heavily funded by donations. These voluntary hospitals were staffed by 
doctors who worked without compensation and nurses who worked for room and 
board.39 For-profit hospitals, on the other hand, are owned by shareholders. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, approximately half of all hospitals were small, proprietary or- 
insiders benefited from sales to proprietary firms. See Eric S. Tower, Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in 
the Conversion of Nonprofit Hospitals, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 157, 158 (1997). 
36. Reverend Pat Robertson and his family purchased a controlling interest in the programming subsidi- 
ary of the Christian Television Network for $183,000 in 1989. It went public in 1992 and its shares were 
worth $90 million. Reverend Robertson and his family retained majority control. In June of 1997, Rupert 
Murdoch agreed to purchase International Family Entertainment, Inc., which was still controlled by the Rob- 
ertson family, for $1.9 billion. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Murdoch Set to Buy Family Cable Concern, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 1997, at Dl. 
37. Note that there also have been conversions of for-profits to nonprofit status. See DOUGLAS M. 
hhNCINO, TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 21-28 (1995 & Supp. 1997). These 
include medical practice groups acquired by integrated delivery systems, freestanding medical groups or clin- 
ics, and hospitals that formed for-profit subsidiaries to engage in certain ventures that now wish to change the 
tax status of such subsidiaries. See id. Conversion of for-profits to nonprofits allow the new nonprofits to: (a) 
receive and accumulate income from exempt activities tax free; (b) receive charitable contribution on a tax- 
deductible basis, see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1997); (c) gain access to the tax exempt bond market; (d) avoid 
"phantom income" from services provided to related organizations; (e) reduce federal payroll taxes; (0 avoid 
paying state property taxes; (g) achieve the prestige and philanthropic support associated with nonprofit, 
charitable status ("the halo effect"); (h) provide tax-sheltered annuities; (i) avoid paying certain federal excise 
taxes, see John D. Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tar Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215 (1994); 0) participate in shared service organizations (hospitals); (k) receive pre- 
ferred postal rates and certain sales tax exemptions; (I) avoid Robinson-Patman Act federal price discrimina- 
tion law; and (m) receive other miscellaneous benefits. 
38. See Bradford H .  Gray, Conversion of Nonprofit Health Plans and Hospitals: An Overview of the Is- 
sues and the Evidence, in CONVERSION TRANSACTIONS: CHANGING BETWEEN NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT 
FORM 1 (National Center on Philanthropy and the Law 1996). 
39. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 13, at 317-18. 
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ganizations owned by physicians as an adjunct to their medical practices. For-profit 
community hospitals declined to about fifteen percent of all community hospitals by 
1 965,40 the dawn of Medicare and Medicaid, federal programs of reimbursement for eld- 
erly and others.41 
B. Medicare and Medicaid 
Unlike virtually every other industrialized nation, the United States still lacks a pro- 
gram that makes health care comprehensively available to all of its citizens. It does have 
Medicare, introduced in 1966, which covers hospital care for those over 65 and some 
others such as the long term disabled.42 A second voluntary Medicare program covers 
certain outpatient costs. Though limited in scope, these programs are enormously expen- 
sive. 
Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program that finances health care for 
certain poor people. Nationwide, about 52% of persons with income levels below the 
federal poverty limit are covered by ~ e d i c a i d . 4 ~  The government contributes 50 to 83% 
of the cost of Medicaid with the states covering the rest.44 Both Medicare and Medicaid 
are enormously expensive, and, by and large, the government, as third party payor, foots 
the bill. 
For-profit hospitals were jump-started by Medicare. The programs also encouraged 
mergers. The most dramatic trends occurred between the mid-1960s and early 1980s with 
the growth of hospital management companies, such as the Hospital Corporation of 
America and American Medical International. These companies were created post- 
Medicare, but their growth stopped by the early 1980s because of changes in Medicare 
reimb~rsement.4~ There were few hospital conversions in the first golden age of the in- 
vestor-owned hospital.46 From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, the overall for-profit- 
nonprofit public composition of the hospital industry changed remarkably little, perhaps 
one percent of the 
The conversion of nonprofit health providers to for-profit status received its greatest 
impetus with the emergence and aggressiveness of ColumbialHCA. Columbia Hospital 
Systems was formed in 1987. Within a decade it grew to a corporation with $20 billion in 
revenues which owned approximately 350 hospitals, 500 health care ofices and scores of 
other medical businesses in 38 states.48 Columbia not only expanded by acquiring for- 
40. See Gray, supra note 38, at 21 (citing American Hospital Association Hospital Statistics (1995)). 
4 1 .  See Gray, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
42. 42 U.S.C. $5 1395-1395ccc (1994). For an excellent summary of these programs, see Barry R. Fur- 
row et al., Health Law, § 13 (1995). 
43. See Furrow, supra note 42,§ 14.01. 
44. See id. 
45. See Gray, supra note 38, at 14-16. 
46. Between 1980-1993 there were a total of 647 convenions: 197 were conversions to for-profit (some 
were government hospitals); 119 of  these were nonprofit to for-profit; and 79 conversions were for-profit to 
nonprofit. See Gray, supra note 38, at 18 (citing Deborah 1. Chollet et al., Conversion of Hospitals and Health 
Plans to For-Profit Status: A Preliminary Investigation of Community Issues. Washington: Alpha Center, May 
1996). 
47. See Gray, supra note 38, at 19-20. 
48. See Martin Gottlieb &-Kurt Eichenwald, Health Care's Giant, NEW YORK TIMES, May 11, 1997, 5 3, 
at 1. 
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profit hospitals, in 1995, they acquired thirty-three tax exempt hospitals as well. In 1996, 
seventeen of its twenty-eight acquisitions or joint ventures involved tax exempt hospitals 
with an additional fourteen pending.49 Despite the recent humbling of ~ o l u m b i a ~ ~  nd 
the slow down of the conversion process, the underlying rationales of efficiency and cost 
containment remain.51 
C. HMO Ownership Trends 
Though prepaid medical services have existed since the 18th century, in the second 
half of the 20th century their use widened because HMOs were seen as devices to hold 
down the ever-increasing cost of health care. Through the Health Care Maintenance Act 
of 1 9 7 3 , ~ ~  the federal govemment served as a venture capitalist for nonprofit HMOs, 
providing loans and financial guarantees. Because of the availability of federal assis- 
tance, nonprofit HMOs dominated. In 1983 the federal loan programs ceased, and HMOs 
with growing capital needs began to convert to for-profit status.53 
49. See Bruce Japsen, Another Record Year for Dealmaking: Activity Among Medium-Size Companies- 
Fuels Continued Drive Toward Consolidation, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 1996 at 37. The 1995 year 
end review of mergers and acquisitions by Modem Healthcare indicated that 48 nonprofit hospitals had con- 
verted or planned to convert to for-profit status in 1995. In 1996, only 8% or 63 of the hospitals that merged 
converted to for-profit status. See Demise of the Not-jor-Profit Has Been Greatly Exaggerated, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 33. 
50. See Lucette Lagnado and Joann S. Lublin, Columbia/HCA Sets $71 Million Accord With IRS to Set- 
tle Compensation Dispute, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at B8; Kurt Eichenwald and N.R. Kleinfield, How 
Scandal Put an End to the Flag- Waving, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, 5 3, at 1; Kurt Eichenwald, US. Con- 
tends Billing Fraud at Columbia was 'Systematic', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at Dl ;  Kurt Eichenwald, 3 Ex- 
ecutives of Hospital Chain Charged With Medicare Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1997, at Al; Lucette 
Lagnado, Columbia Inquiry YieldF First Indictment: Insurance Companies Start an Independent Probe Into 
Billing Practices, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1997, at A3. Federal and state authorities have been reviewing billing 
practices at the home health care division as well as the coding of patients' diagnoses for Medicare reim- 
bursement. These investigations, which involve much of the hospital chain, have prompted Medicare to stop 
signing off on annual claim audits to leave as many cases open as possible. Columbia settled a dispute with 
Alabama's Medicaid program for $40 million. Because of projected settlements and fines, bond rating agen- 
cies have placed Columbia/HCA debt under review for a potential downgrade. See Keith A. Markey, Colum- 
biaIHCA, Valueline Investment Survey, Ian. 2, 1998, at 653. The negative publicity has taken a toll on admis- 
sions, as doctors, who had customarily referred a portion of their patients to Columbia, have begun to send 
business elsewhere. 
5 1. See Anita Sharp, Entrepreneurs Look to Profit on Nonprofit Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at 
B4 (discussing new groups of entrepreneurs who seek to purchase nonprofit hospitals); see generally, Law- 
rence E .  Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes in 
Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221 (1997). Bradford Gray has offered six policy reasons for encour- 
aging conversions: 1) to facilitate health coverage of the uninsured because the supercession of the nonprofit 
form would force the government to provide health care; 2) to move more organizations onto the tax rolls; 3) 
to move charitable assets to more productive uses; 4) to enhance access to needed capital; 5) to facilitate con- 
solidation and reduction of capacity; and 6) to end the 'fiction' that nonprofits are more socially beneficial 
than their for-profit counterparts. Gray, however, concludes that the nonprofit form continues to hold signifi- 
cant advantages over the proprietary form in health care. See Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and 
Hospitals: What's at Stake?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr., 1997,29,33-34. 
52. 42 U.S.C. 55 300e-300e-14a (1994). 
53.  See Claxton, supra note 4, at 12. In 1981, 82% of HMOs, accounting for 88% of overall member- 
ship, were nonprofit. By 1995, the proportion of nonprofit plans had decreased to 29%, accounting for 41% of 
overall membership. See id. 
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D. Differences Between Hospitals and HMOs 
Investor ownership of hospitals emerged late in a mature field. The ownership pic- 
ture of HMOs has been heavily influenced by the rapid growth in the field over the past 
two decades. Only one percent of nonprofit hospitals have converted to for-profit status, 
whereas one third of HMOs have converted to for-profit status. Why have so few hospi- 
tals converted to for-profit status compared to HMOs? The hospital as an institution has a 
more longstanding and significant place in most communities. Sales to for-profit chains 
have been contentious because ownership by national investor-owned f m s  threaten a 
valuable community institution by replacing local control with new distantly determined 
standards. Additionally, the charitable hospital has been an elite eleemosynary institution. 
Historically, hospital boards constituted important philanthropic activities of the most in- 
fluential and powerful members of the local power structure.54 
Where possible, most conversions to for-profit status are negotiated in private. The 
HMO conversions did not generate the same concerns because HMO boards were more 
likely to be composed of insiders. HMO boards were entrepreneurial and less representa- 
tive of the broader community than hospitals. Conversions began at the time of increas- 
ing demand, so HMOs did not have to fight valued community institutions for market 
share.55 The Internal Revenue Service's concern over HMOs led to restrictive require- 
ments for tax e ~ e m p t i o n , ~ ~  and when capital resources dried up, the for-profit form be- 
came attractive. 
Despite the controversial reactions by the communities in which they are located, 
there are enormous temptations for local hospitals to convert. Too many hospital beds for 
too few patients engenders competition between hospitals. For-profit chains using 
economies of scale and instituting administrative efficiencies are able to provide services 
for less than nonprofit c~unte r~ar t s .~ '  Increasing capital requirements for new equipment 
necessary to attract patient business place many nonprofit hospitals at a competitive dis- 
advantage. Investment bankers have spoken to trustees regarding the "monetizing [of] 
the community hospital asset."58 The economic argument runs as follows: the law of 
comparative advantage postulates that resources, dollars, people, and business have a 
best use. Society or the community is better off when that best use is realized.59 By con- 
verting former nonprofit hospitals to for-profit, the theory is that capital in bricks and 
mortar has been released for a better social use. Community hospital boards faced with a 
parlous financial situation and induced by what seems to be huge sums have sold their 
hospitals too quickly, at too low a value with little community input. 
54. See Gray, supra note 38, at 29. 
55. Seeid. at31. 
56. See Sound Health v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978) (granting an HMO tax exempt status when it 
sewed the public interest and was not engaged in providing a form of insurance); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 
39,829 (Aug. 25, 1990) (granting tax exempt status to HMO); but see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Aug. 24, 
1990) (failing to grant tax exempt status to HMO); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 24, 1990) (same). 
57.  See Singer, supra note 51, at 230. 
58. Daniel M. Cain, Introduction to Bridging the Transition from Community Hospital to Charitable 
Foundation: An Emerging Force in Social Change, STRATEGIES IN CAPITAL FIN., Spring 1996 at 1. 
59. See generally Craig Havighurst, Solid Foundations, 29 Health Sys. Rev. 33 (1996) mailable in 
LEXIS, BusFin Library, ABI File. 
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E. Blue Cross Conversions 
Blue Cross is an insurance plan for the less affluent. Hospitals established Blues 
plans as not-for-profits in the 1930s to ensure that patients would have the means to pay 
for care. For years, Blues enjoyed regulatory and tax exemptions because of their social 
mission.60 Generally Blue Cross took greater risks than other insurers. It used to be said 
that Blues' claims departments' mission was to figure out how not to reject the claim but 
how to pay it. 
There are nearly sixty independent Blue Cross plans serving nearly seventy million 
people in widely differing markets.61 There were nearly 100 such plans a few years ago, 
but competitive pressures caused by the growth of managed care plans and drastically 
increased capital needs have led to waves of mergers and attempted conversions to for- 
profit status.62 This is a time of tumult and change as Blues are merging, affiliating in 
consortia, creating for-profit subsidiaries, and converting to for-profit status.63 Critics say 
these conversions are siphoning billions into investors' and executives' pockets. Several 
plans have converted to for-profit status or announced conversion plans.64 Other Blues 
are merging, which may be a prelude to for-profit conve r~ ion .~~  The reasons for conver- 
sion correlate to those of hospitals and HMOs: a need for more capital and new competi- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  In the case of Blues plans, the competition has come from HMOs, which through 
expansion have siphoned off customers from Blue Cross. In New York State, Empire 
Blue Cross lost five million subscribers to HMOs in a few years.67 
Some regulators have objected to Blue Cross conversions. These critics contend that 
the Blues Plans were established as nonprofits because of their public mission, and that 
they are essentially owned by the public. Therefore, the public should receive money for 
their conversions rather than private individuals, and Blues' assets should not be used as 
seed money for for-profit ventures. 
IV. CAUSES OF CONVERSION TO FOR-PROFIT STATUS 
Conversions of nonprofit health care providers allow the new for-profits to: avoid 
increased Internal Revenue Service regulation and scrutiny; take advantage of current 
60. See PAUL STARK THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 298 (1982). 
6 1. See Liz Runge, The Blues are Learning Some New Tunes, 97 Best's Rev.-Life-Health Insur. ed 60 
(Mar. 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, BRLIFE File. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. Four are completed. Others are in the process. Blues in Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
York are in various stages of conversion. See Claxton, supra note 4, at 11-12. Three other Blues' plans- 
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Missouri-have owned publicly traded managed care subsidiaries for several years. 
See Louise Kertesz, Not Your Father's Blue Cross, Modem Healthcare, October 14, 1996, at 68. 
65. Most Blue Cross Plans have formed wholly-owned, for-profit subsidiaries offering a spectrum of 
products. 
66. Blues lost their federal tax exempt status in 1986 because the provision of commercial-type insur- 
ance as a substantial part of an organization's activities was no longer an exempt activity. See Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2390 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. $5 501(m), 833 (1986)). 
67. See Milt Freudenheim, Empire Blue Cross Seeking to Become For-Profir Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 1996, at A1; Milt Freudenheim, Crisis Looms as Big Insurer Keeps Sliding, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at 
$ 1,31. 
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operating losses; compete better and seek profits aggressively; provide equity incentives 
to service providers, such as physicians; engage in unlimited lobbying and political ac- 
tivity; take advantage of private and public equity capital markets; and allow weaker 
hospitals to consolidate and replace antiquated equipment and heavy debt load. 
The fundamental reason for health care providers' moves to for-profit status is eas- 
ier access to capital.68 Historically, nonprofit health care organizations raised capital 
through the use of tax exempt financing, which enabled nonprofit health care borrowers 
to pay a lower cost of interest than if the regular capital markets were used. In the early 
1980s, there were significant savings over entering the taxable bond market. A second 
benefit from tax exempt financing was arbitrage investment profits. The proceeds from 
tax exempt financing were invested in taxable securities earning a greater rate of inter- 
est-the profits of which went to the exempt organization. Congress caught up with this 
and required that if a nonprofit borrowed with tax exempt bonds, it could not reinvest the 
funds to receive a taxable rate of interest.69 Still, there were loopholes. 
One loophole was the incentive to borrow in advance of one's need. Institutions 
would invest in for-profit vehicles and then use the dollars when they needed them. 
Much of the overcapitalization and the overbuilding in the hospital sector resulted from 
the use of this technique. The money was there and could be used for certain periods of 
time for anything, but eventually hospitals had to build something. Thus, there was a 
great incentive to borrow. 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act changed and limited the use of tax exempt financing. 
Pre-1986, twenty-five percent of tax exempt bonds could be used for unrelated business 
operations. These might include physicians' offices, management contracts with private 
companies and cooperative ventures. Now there is a five-percent limit on unrelated busi- 
ness  operation^.^^ There was also a $150 million limit imposed on any section 501(c)(3) 
organization that borrows money for other than hospital purposes.7' 
These tax law changes made tax exempt financing less valuable to the nonprofit and 
limited a hospital's flexibility. Additionally, the spread between tax exempt financing 
and for-profit financing (which was 70430% in the 1980s) moved to 8590% in the 
1990s, narrowing the significance of interest savings. The tax exempt marketplace be- 
came over-saturated with tax exempt paper of financially weak hospitals, leading to a 
downgrading by bond rating agencies and making the regular capital markets more com- 
parable in terms of the cost of borrowing. All in all, the desirability of nonprofit status 
diminished for hospitals, and their competitive position vis a vis for-profits deteriorated 
as the latter had easier access to capital.72 
68. See Mancino, supra note 37, at 21-7. 
69. See I.R.C. 5 148 (1986). 
70. See 1.R.C. 5 145(a) (1997). 
71. See id.; 5 145(b)(2)(C). The $150 million borrowing limit was a restriction on mergers of nonprofit 
hospitals. This was prospectively repealed for capital expenditures by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, sec. 
222, P.L. 105-34 (Aug. 5, 1997), effective the date of enactment. Specifically, new paragraph (5) of Internal 
Revenue Code section 145(b) ("$150,000,000 Limitation on Bonds Other Than Hospital Bonds") reads: 
(5) Termination of Limitation. This subsection shall not apply with respect to bonds issued 
after the date of the enactment of this paragraph as part of an issue 95 percent or more of the net 
proceeds of which are to be used to finance capital expenditures incurred after such date. 
One cannot overestimate the economic importance of shifts in the tax laws. 
72. See Singer, supra note 51, at 227-28 (concluding that "the exempt hospital, having reached its use 
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V. WHAT IS A CONVERSION I  THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND STATE CHARITABLE 
CORPORATION  LAW?^^ 
A. THE CONVERSION I  PLACE 
A conversion in place refers to a process by which the board recommends an 
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation, deleting its nonprofit aspects 
and adding for-profit powers.74 The newly converted for-profit corporation is empow- 
ered to issue stock, permitted to conduct all lawful business, and allowed to pay divi- 
d e n d ~ . ~ ~  In a conversion in place the legal entity remains in place, the "xyz charitable 
corporation" merely becomes the "xyz business corporation." Existing contractual rela- 
tionships remain. The conversion in place is permitted only in a few states.76 Typically, it 
is favored by HMOs, preferred provider organizations, and other managed care organi- 
zations not dependent on fixed assets like real property. 
B. Asset Sales 
Another conversion approach is a sale of assets, whereby a nonprofit corporation, 
exempt under section 50 l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, sells its operating assets to 
a for-profit corporation for fair market value. Unlike a conversion in place, an asset sale 
requires the for-profit to obtain appropriate state licenses. After the sale, the for-profit 
corporation owns the charitable corporation's assets, which in return may receive stock, 
notes, or other property in addition to cash as consideration. This transaction structure is 
typical for the acquisition of a nonprofit hospital by a for-profit a ~ q u i r e r . ~ ~  Federal and 
state laws require that the proceeds from the sale continue to be held in charitable trust 
and used for charitable purposes.78 Foundations are usually the post-conversion holders 
of these charitable assets. 
C. Merger 
Another technique for conversion involves a merger of a nonprofit corporation into 
a for-profit. The charity forms a new for-profit corporation to which it contributes its as- 
sets in exchange for cash, notes, and stock. Thereafter, the nonprofit corporation merges 
restriction ceiling, may find itself pitted against an organization with a seemingly endless capital supply"). 
For nonprofit HMOs, tax exempt debt was unavailable after 1983 for new product development, geographic 
expansion, or acquisitions. See MANCINO, supra note 37, at 21.01-5. 
73. See WNCmO, supra note 37, at 21-7 to 21-9 (developing this typology); see generally Thomas Silk, 
Conversions of Tax-Erempt Nonprofir Organizations: Federal Tax Law and State Charitable Law Issues, 13 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 745 (1996). 
74. Typically, the board will recommend an amendment and the members, if there are any, must ap- 
prove. 
75. The fundamental distinction between a charitable nonprofit and a business corporation is the nondis- 
tribution constraint. For example, the nonprofit cannot distribute its earnings to members or shareholders. See 
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprojit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980); REV. MODEL 
NONPROFIT COW. ACT 8 13.01 (1988); CAL. COW. CODE 8 5410 (West 1997). 
76. Arizona, California, Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia. WNCINO, supra note 37, at 21-7. 
77. It is common that the for-profit will purchase selected assets, usually the most profitable assets. 
78. See supra notes 22 and 25 and accompanying text. 
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into the for-profit c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ~ ~  Here again, state and federal laws require the exchange 
proceeds to remain in the charitable stream and to be used for charitable purposes. A 
foundation or nonprofit corporation is created to receive the cash or stock from the sur- 
viving corporation. After the conversion, there are ordinarily two organizations: the for- 
profit corporation and a private foundation. 
D. Drop-down Conversions 
Drop-down conversions involve the transfer of some or all of the operating assets 
and liabilities of a hospital or HMO to a wholly or partially owned subsidiary in ex- 
change for stock andlor notes. This approach is used when an organization, such as an 
HMO, desires to convert some or all of its assets into a f ~ r - ~ r o f i t . ~ ~  After the transaction 
is completed, the for-profit subsidiary may enter the equity markets through an initial 
public offering. 
In a drop-down, the original owner of the assets usually retains a substantial per- 
centage of equity in the newly formed corporation. This type of conversion, when used 
by an HMO, is usually a preliminary step to another form of transaction, such as a take- 
over by another health plan. Some Blue Cross plans have argued that they do not need to 
transfer any assets to charity, as the nonprofit remains in e ~ i s t e n c e . ~ ~  After the conver- 
sion, three organizations may exist: in addition to the for-profit corporation and the foun- 
dation, a section 501(c)(4) organization may be created to receive and hold the stock for 
later sale and to remit the proceeds to the foundation. 
VI. MAJOR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SECTOR-SHIFT 
The shift to for-profit status has highlighted the inadequacy of state conversion pro- 
cedures. Several jurisdictions have responded by strengthening and slowing the conver- 
sion process.82 California, for example, addressed the inadequacy of its conversion pro- 
cedures by enacting legislation that requires the conversion price to be at fair market 
79. This is permitted in a few states: Arizona, California, and Virginia. MANCINO, supro note 37, at 21-8. 
80. In 1993, Blue Cross of California transferred a substantial percentage of its operating assets to Well- 
point Healthcare, a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary. See inra Part V1I.E. 
81. See infra notes 144-146. 
82. See Aruz. REV. STAT. 5 10-2592 (1997); CAL CORP. CODE 5 5914 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. 4 
14-3-1041 (Harrison 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 2115.11 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, 5 
904 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. 4 71-20,108 (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 420-A:17 (1995); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 5 109.34 (Baldwin 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 27-19-29 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. 5 38.24204.1 
(Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 24.03.195 (West 1996). For pending legislation see S. Res. 283, 
77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997) (the regular session adjourned on May 27, 1997 and the bill carried 
over to the 1998 regular session); H. Res. 287, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (regular session adjourned on 
April 7, 1997 and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 1722, 181st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997) (This 
bill was submitted to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means); S. Res. 149, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 1997) (This bill was submitted to the Senate Committee on Health Policy and Senior Citizens); S. Res. 
327, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1997 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (The regular session adjourned on May 16, 1997 
and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 1550, 207th Leg., 1996 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 19976 (This bill was 
submitted to the Senate Committee on Human Services); S. Res. 1056, Sess. of 1997 (N.C. 1997) (The regular 
session adjourned, and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 279,46th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997) (The 1997 
regular session adjourned, and the bill was carried over to 1998 regular session); H. Res. 1923, 100th Gen. 
Assembly (Tenn. 1997) (The regular session adjourned, and the bill was carried over to 1998 regular session). 
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value, the assets resulting from the conversion to be held by an independent foundation, 
and the converting organization to have in place policies prohibiting conflicts of inter- 
e ~ t . ~ ~  Other jurisdictions are trying to deal with this sector shift by improving monitoring 
in an area which has been largely self-regulated. Nebraska has passed legislation regu- 
lating the sale of hospitals to ensure disclosure of conflicts of interest, sale at fair value, 
and proper use of charitable assets.84 
Another product of the conversion wave has been the reawakening of the role of the 
state attorney general in the regulation of charities. In Massachusetts the attorney gen- 
eral's office used its historic powers of oversight to shape the conversion process.85 Cali- 
fornia increased the role of the attorney general to control and monitor c~nve r s ions .~~  
Attorneys general in other states have also attempted to become involved in the conver- 
sion process.87 Publicity has been a great catalyst. However, most attorneys general have 
little experience and are overmatched by for-profit converters' experts and counsel. 
Another result of this healthcare sector shift has been the revitalization of the cy 
pres doctrine. The theory of cy pres is that when a charitable purpose becomes impossi- 
ble, inexpedient, impracticable of fulfillment or already accomplished, equity will permit 
the trustee to substitute another charitable object which approaches the original purpose 
as closely as possible.88 In modifying the trust's purpose, the court must follow the do- 
nor's original purpose cy pres comme possible-Norman French for "as near as possi- 
ble."89 The power of modification has been strictly construed.90 
Cy pres comes into play at two points in the conversion process. The first is in de- 
termining whether assets which were given for nonprofit purposes can be used in a con- 
version or even in a joint venture with a for-profit. Generally, if a nonprofit hospital, an 
HMO, or Blue Cross proposes to sell its assets or enters into a whole hospital joint ven- 
ture, the charity must seek advance court approval in a cy pres type action.91 A Michigan 
trial court judge ruled that a joint venture between a Michigan nonprofit acute care hos- 
pital facility and Columbia/HCA violated the state's charitable purpose laws.92 The court 
concluded that state law prohibited the transfer of charitable assets to a for-profit joint 
venture.93 The second point at which cy pres comes into play is after the conversion: 
must the proceeds from the conversion be put to the same charitable use as before? 
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $5 1399.71(e)(I), 1399.72(c) (West 1998). 
84. NEB. REV. STAT. $ 8  71-20,103 to 71-20,113 (1996). 
85. Richard C. Allen, The Massachusetts Experience, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 85; CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 1399.75(e). 
86. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 1399.75 (e) (West 1998); CAL. CORP. CODE 5 5914 (West 
1998). 
87. Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Georgia, Oklahoma and Rhode Island. See James F. Owens, Stares 
Regulate Non-Profit Hospital Conversions, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at Bl 0. 
88. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES ch. 22, $ 43 1, at 95 
(2d rev. ed. 1991). 
89. Id. 
90. See id. 
91. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App.3d 359 (1977) (involving the lease of a non- 
profit hospital's facilities, the profits of which were to be used to open additional medical clinics); Allen, su- 
pro note 85, at 87. 
92. Kelley v. Michigan Afiliated Healthcare, No. 96-83848C2, 96 TNT 187-18 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for the 
County of Ingharn Sept. 5, 1996). 
93. This was not directly a cy pres issue, for the court did not rule directly on the cy pres point. 
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Another issue that has arisen is whether the Internal Revenue Service should be in- 
volved in these conversions, examining the fiduciary responsibilities of nonprofit direc- 
tors, which is traditionally a function of the states and state corporate law. The IRS his- 
torically has had a rear view mirror approach to regulation of such sales.94 
VII. TROUBLE SPOTS-PROBLEMS AND CONVERSION ISSUES 
A. Conflicts of Interest 
A fundamental problem with conversions is that directors of the nonprofit entity 
may be involved with the for-profit company. They may be promised stock or already be 
substantial shareholders of the for-profit venture. The acquiring corporation may offer 
bonuses, salaries, or "golden parachutes"95 if the director joins the for-profit organiza- 
tion. There may be contingency compensation based upon the success of completing the 
transaction. In its nonprofit guise, the fiduciary obligation of the director is to obtain the 
highest value for the nonprofit and to assure that the community is provided with health 
care. That individual's interests as a for-profit shareholder or a future employee may be 
in opposition. This has been a particular problem in hospital and Blue Cross conversions 
where executives of the nonprofit are promised substantial bonuses and long term com- 
pensation agreements. In Ohio, the management of Blue Cross of Ohio accepted an offer 
to be sold to ~ o l u m b i a / H ~ ~ . ~ ~  Four executives were to receive $19 million in payouts as 
part of the transaction, and seven former directors were to receive $3 million.97 Gener- 
94. This has not been so with joint ventures between a nonprofit and a for-profit where the former is at- 
tempting to preserve its exempt status. In Revenue Ruling 98-15, the IRS tightened the ability of for-profit 
hospitals to control joint venture arrangements with non profit hospitals. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 
6; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (1991); see also Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980) 
(holding that a nonprofit theatre company whose activities included the presentation of dramatic theatre pro- 
ductions, workshop for new American playwrights, and the establishment of a fund to assist new and estab- 
lished playwrights which entered into joint venture with investors who were to receive a percentage of profits 
from production was entitled to tj 501(c)(3) status because commercial investors were limited partners without 
control). Additionally, Internal Revenue oversight at the conversion stage raises federalism questions which 
will be discussed later in this article. 
95. That is, substantial termination payments. 
96. The transaction was structured as follows: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ohio (BCBSO) was to spin off 
a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary, Blue Co., and transfer substantially all of BCBSO's assets to it. A 
wholly owned subsidiary of Columbia/HCA would purchase all of Blue Co.'s stock for $299.5 million. At the 
time BCBSO had $233 million in reserves. If BCBSO failed to exercise its best efforts to transfer its rights to 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield trademark to Blue Co., the purchase price would be reduced by $50 million. If 
BCBSO accepted another acquisition proposal h m  another suitor, it would be required to pay a stiff "good 
bye fee" of $25 million, in addition to sending its subscribers to ColumbiaRiCA hospitals and paying Colum- 
bia/HCA's highest hospital service rates for a period of five years. See Craig R. Mayton, The Viewfrom Ohio, 
HEALTH Am., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 94. One can only wonder about the quality of Blue Cross's lawyering in 
signing such a one-sided agreement. Perhaps the answer is that the insider general counsel was scheduled to 
receive $1.2 million for a 10-year agreement not to compete and $2.3 million for two consulting agreements. 
See Diane Solov, Blue Cross' Top Executives to Get Millions in Buyour, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 10, 1996, at 
1A. Furthermore, Blue Cross's outside counsel was scheduled to receive $3.5 million for a five-year agree- 
ment not to compete. See id. 
97. Bloomberg Bus. News, Columbia/HCA to Pay Blue Cross Oflcials, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at 
D6. The national Blue Cross Association revoked the chartered Ohio Blue Cross for this attempt and the Ohio 
Dept. of Insurance rejected the transaction on March 12, 1997. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ohio Blues Gives Up: 
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ally, these conversions are "friendly" transactions as viewed by management. The gov- 
erning body and key staff of the converting nonprofit usually work closely with the for- 
profit entity. This raises questions about the integrity of the organization's decision- 
making process as well as the quality of information provided by the staff to the board. 
The charity may be operated during the period leading up to the transaction in a way that 
potentially devalues the organization's business or assets in order to make the acquisition 
more attractive to a potential future employer.98 The response of several jurisdictions has 
been to introduce legislation prohibiting bonuses as part of a t r an~ac t i on .~~  Most other 
jurisdictions have declined to do anything. 
There should be enhanced scrutiny of conflicts of interest with respect to placement 
of proceeds, whether into a new nonprofit entity or with a joint venture undertaken by a 
nonprofit entity and a for-profit purchaser.lOO All transactions should be approved and 
negotiated by an independent committee of disinterested outside directors. This may not 
be possible in HMO situations, where boards of nonprofit HMOs have consisted largely 
of insiders. The test then would be the intrinsic fairness of the transaction to the nonprofit 
with the burden on the board of directors. All of these transactions should be subject to 
review by the attorney general and by a court. 
B. Valuation Issues 
At the heart of the conversion controversy are difficult issues of valuation. How can 
one attain a fair market value for the converting organization? Nonprofit entities present 
greater valuation difficulties than for-profit f m s .  Nonprofit valuation is more complex 
and uncertain than the valuation of a comparably-sized for-profit.lOl 
One factor is that there is no readily ascertainable market value. Another is that 
nonprofit f m s  are not regularly scrutinized by gaggles of securities analysts and invest- 
ment advisors that follow for-profit counterparts. Valuation, then, rests upon the ap- 
praiser's craft, inherently a subjective process. The subjectivity of the valuation process 
is overlaid by the very human and economically rational behavior that the appraiser may 
use their discretion to serve the interests of those who hire them.Io2 
Insurer Agrees to Call Off Columbia Deal, Remove CEO, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 24, 1997, at 2. 
98. See Allen, supra note 85, at 86. 
99. Colorado has prohibited converting corporations from going public within three years of a conver- 
sion. Usually the former nonprofit managers would own substantial sums of stock as a form of bonus, which 
would become enormously valuable on a public offering. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 10-16-324 (West 
1997). 
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 1399.71(e) (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting inurement and conflicts 
of interest in joint ventures and their transactions by a nonprofit). 
101. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Nonprofit Conversion Transactions: Existing Fiduciary Duties and Nec- 
essav Reforms, in CONVERSION TRANSACTIONS: CHANGING BETWEEN NONPROFIT & FOR-PROFIT FORM 1 
(1996) (stating that "nonprofit conversions suffer when compared to for-profit acquisitions because of. . . the 
general difficulty of valuation in the nonprofit conversion context"); see also GAO, Not-jor-Profit Hospitals 
Conversion Issues Prompt Increased State Oversight, 19 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 261, 264-66 (1998) 
(describing valuation approaches). 
102. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and What Can Be 
Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 37 (1989); Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or 
Should We Care, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951,965 (1992); Tower, supra note 35, at 169; Elliott J. Weiss, The Low o j  
Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 255 (1983). The 
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Traditionally in health care transactions three different methods of valuation are 
utilized: 1) replacement cost or asset valuation; 2) market comparison, which involves 
setting the sale price in relation to comparable assets; and 3) the most widely used 
method, discounted cash flow analysis, which establishes a price by projecting a health 
provider's earnings potential.lo3 Valuation of nonprofit hospitals is generally calculated 
as a multiple of a hospital's earnings before the expenses of interest, depreciation, taxes, 
and amortization, known by the acronym, "EBIDTA." Appraisers generally have placed 
the value of a nonprofit hospital at five to seven times EBIDTA, though valuations out- 
side of this range are not uncommon.104 Valuation is severely tested in the health care 
area where there has not been a market, and in which the conversion is followed thereaf- 
ter by a substantial increase in value of a publicly-traded health care company in com- 
parison to its nonprofit value.lo5 
The subjectivity and difficulty of valuation may be demonstrated by the sale of St. 
Vincent's Hospital in Worcester, Massachusetts, part of Fallon Healthcare System, to 
OrNda, a large investor-owned hospital chain.lo6 The sale was for $4 million, though the 
plant was worth substantially more. The hospital, burdened with debt, handed the keys 
over with the promise that the for-profit would run the hospital and pay off long term 
debt of $68 million. However, OrNda, which purchased the Fallon Clinic as well, paid 
over $60 million to the 200 doctors and executives who ran Fallon Healthcare System of 
which the hospital was but a part. The hospital had property and equipment valued at $72 
million and working capital of $17 million. The community got $4 million, after the 
Massachusetts Attorney General intervened and issued a glowing press release on the 
conversion. The Attorney General's appraiser, Arthur Anderson Consulting, had con- 
cluded the hospital had a negative net value because of its heavy debt, and felt OrNda 
overpaid for the hospital and clinic. Anderson compared St. Vincents to other hospitals 
and treated it as worse off than any in a comparable group. If it had treated the hospital as 
merely equal to the weakest in the sample, it would have been worth $20 million. If the 
sample had been broadened, and Anderson had based its calculations on the weakest 
subjectivity and willingness of investment bankers to issue fairness opinions that are favorable to the needs of 
the retainer is demonstrated in Mills v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1272-73, 1281-82 (Del. 1989). On May 30, 
1988, investment bankers informed management that a restructuring price of $64.15 was fair, and on June 7, 
1988, investment bankers advised that the company had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share. On 
August 25, 1988, in the context of a hostile tender offer after urgings by managemen& the same group of in- 
vestment bankers issued a new opinion that $80 was unfair and inadequate. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. 
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (involving an investment bank 
which structured a poison pill defensive measure; when the tender offer commenced, the bank was hired to 
determine fairness and would receive a bonus if hostile suitor lost proxy fight, and the bank wrote that the 
opinion offer was unfair); Hanson Trust v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781 F.2d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(dealing with an investment bank which structured and arranged financing in a lock up option, then declared it 
was unfair). 
103. See Tower, supra note 35, at 160. 
104. See Robert A. Boisture & Albert G. Lauber, Full Text Comment Letters: Caplin & Drysdale Com- 
ments on Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, 16 EXEMPTORG. TAX REV. 650,652-53 (1997). 
105. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 2-3. 
106. See Gerard O'Neill et al., Projit Motives Doom Worcester Hospital, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1996, at 
Al .  
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hospital from a larger sample, it would have been worth $40 million. An independent real 
estate valuation firm hired by the Boston Globe came up with a value of $38 million.lo7 
The problem of determining value is that a hospital may have a different value as a 
nonprofit, a for-profit, a for-profit taken over by a chain, or a hospital that will be the 
first in an area to convert. The hospital's value may also be relative to the competition in 
the area, as well as to other market specific factors. Hospital valuations encompass a va- 
riety of industry specific factors including scope of services, market share and ease of 
entry of competition, payor mix, Medicare gainfloss recapturelo8 and patient mix.lo9 The 
difficulties of valuation may ease dramatically as a result of the growing number of ac- 
quisitions. Future earnings capacity, as estimated by capitalized earnings approaches and 
discounted cash flow analyses, will make determination of fair market value similar to 
the determination of value through an initial public offering of a close corporation. 
Other factors may assist conversion sales at fair market value. Increased state regu- 
lation and legislation may also assure conversions at a fair market value.l1° Some have 
recommended that legislation require a market test.ll l In other words, any hospital, 
HMO, or Blue Cross that is up for sale or conversion would be required to offer itself to 
other bidders beyond the initial offeror once the nonprofit board has reached a decision 
to sell or convert. The requirement of a market test would entail public disclosure of the 
proposed transaction, the release of relevant information (subject to appropriate confi- 
dentiality safeguards) to responsible persons, an adequate time period for competing of- 
fers to be made, and prohibitions on lock ups and other devices which would taint the 
test.112 
Is there an absolute duty to maximize financial return? Under Delaware law, once it 
appears a corporation will be sold, the duty of the board of directors is to maximize "the 
company's value at a sale for the stockholder's benefit."l13 In the nonprofit context the 
107. See id. 
108. Under Medicare regulations, a Medicare provider is entitled to reimbursement for the indirect cost of 
using tangible assets through an allowance for depreciation. See 42 C.F.R. 4 413.134 (1998). Upon disposal of 
the asset, the regulations provide for adjustment of the allowable cost determination. If a conversion or dis- 
posal results in a gain, such as the sale price exceeding the book value of the asset, the government may re- 
coup depreciation expenses paid to the provider. The adjustment for a gain is limited to the actual amount of 
depreciation previously allowed as Medicare allowable costs. See 42 C.F.R 5 413.134(0. Conversely, if the 
sale price is less than the depreciated book value of the asset, the provider is entitled to reimbursement for 
Medicare's proportionate share of the loss. The amount of an adjustment allowed for a loss is limited to the 
undepreciated basis of the asset permitted under the program. See id.; see olso St. Mark's Charities v. Shalala, 
952 F. Supp. 1488, 1490 (D. Utah 1997) (discussing 42 C.F.R. 4 413-134(f) (1998)). 
109. See Tower, supro note 35, at 161 -62. 
1 10. See NEB. REV. STAT. 5 71-20,108(5) (1 996) (listing factors for evaluating whether "appropriate steps 
have been taken to safeguard the value of charitable assets"). 
1 1 1. See Goldschmid, supro note 101, at 13-14. 
112. A lock-up is a generic name for a variety of techniques used in a tender offer to assure that a par- 
ticular bidder will be successful and to thwart competitive bidding. Sometimes stock is issued to the favored 
bidder, making the acquisition more expensive for other offerors. Other devices include an agreement to reim- 
burse the favored bidder's fees and the sale of prized assets of the target to the favored bidder. See RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1020-1023 (2d ed. 
1995). Lock-ups are not illegal per se under Delaware law, the most important jurisdiction for corporate law. 
See Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986). 
1 13. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
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board's responsibilities should be to maximize the return to the public, including benefits 
to the community. This does not necessarily mean that the board must accept the highest 
price. Whether or not to recommend acceptance of a particular bidder is within the busi- 
ness judgment of the board. It may be that the highest bid will not be the best for the or- 
ganization as a deliverer of healthcare. Or, its financial situation may be precarious. For 
instance, in the Family Health Plan conversion described earlier,l14 Maxicare Health 
Plans made a competing offer at a substantially higher price and sued to prevent HMO 
Health Group's conversion of FHP.~ I S  The court held that the law did not require a sale 
to the highest bidder.l l6 
C. Lack o/Disclosure 
Whenever possible, the principals to conversions attempt to impose a veil of secrecy 
over the transaction. At the beginning of negotiations between the for-profit acquirer and 
the nonprofit, a confidentiality agreement is signed. l l7 Some conversion transactions 
have been completed in secret without community knowledge. Should the community 
have the right to know the terms of the venture? 
Should there be community input into the terms of the transaction? There is nothing 
similar to the disclosure mandates of American securities regulation.'18 The participants 
in the transaction argue that the terms are proprietary information and fear that disclosure 
could jeopardize the transaction. In Massachusetts, the attorney general agreed with the 
parties in the Fallon Healthcare-OrNda conversion that the underlying financial docu- 
ments that justify prices paid are trade secrets that are nobody else's business.l l9 During 
the attempted sale of Blue Cross of Ohio, state regulators, though promising to keep the 
1 14. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
1 15. See Maxicare Health Plans v. Gumbiner, No. C-565072 (Los Angeles Superior Ct. 1986). One year 
after the conversion Maxicare went into bankruptcy. 
1 16. See Id. 
117. The difficulty of finding out details about these transactions is illustrated by the testimony of Linda 
B. Miller, President of the Volunteer Trustees Foundation: 
Confidentiality agreements are signed early in the negotiation-and the community never 
knows what the deal looks like. It never knows what the hospital considered by way of other 
offers, how the asset was valued, what the for-profit buyer actually paid out and what it 
got in return, what portion of the proceeds were re-deployed to a charitable foundation or 
under what terms. Everything is secret. (Three years after Nashville Memorial in TN was 
sold, the incorporators of the hospital are still in court trying to find out what the hospital was 
sold for!) 
Goldschmid supra note 101, at 3 (quoting Miller's statement before the Committee on Health and Human Re- 
sources of the Nebraska State Legislature on February 1, 1996). 
118. Generally, the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates public corporations, which means 
corporations with at least 500 shareholders and approximately $10 million in assets. See Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 5 12(g), 15 U.S.C. 5 781(g) (1997). Rule 12g-1 exempts from registration companies with assets 
of less than $10 million. 17 C.F.R. 5 240.12g-1 (1997). There are an estimated 14,000 such corporations in the 
United States. 
119. See O'NEILL et al., supra note 106. In California, according to a researcher with whom the author 
spoke, the Blue Cross of California Document file concerning the most contentious conversion has been al- 
most completely redacted by the Commissioner of Corporation's Office, making scholarly inquiry difficult if 
not impossible. Telephone interview with Teresa McMahon (September 1996). 
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public informed, privately attempted to keep the facts of the transaction secret during the 
review process and released no information including facts about the $3.9 million paid to 
board members. 120 The Ohio Supreme Court found that insurance regulators abused their 
discretion in keeping this information secret.121 Recent conversion legislation by states 
requires that the plan for conversion be available to the public and often sets forth what 
information must be made a ~ a i 1 a b l e . l ~ ~  
Another important issue is what information should be part of the public record. 
Though some states now require or have held public hearings,123 the legislation does not 
specify what role the public is supposed to play or which public is to be involved. The 
state attorney general formally represents the public interest. Is the hearing mere window 
dressing, allowing anyone to vent their anger or views or is it to have a genuine role in 
the conversion process? Patricia A. Butler has pointed out that there are likely to be many 
publics with different agendas: insurance plan policyholders, persons sewed by different 
activities of the converting hospital, the medical staff, potential beneficiaries of a foun- 
dation, and the "community."'24 These diverse views are more likely to be heard 
through a public hearing. A second purpose of the public hearing confirms Justice Bran- 
deis's observation that "[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, electric light the 
most efficient policeman."125 The conflicts of interest that many of these transactions 
contain are brought to the surface and often cannot survive the outrage of the public, en- 
couraging a stricter scrutiny by r eg~1a to r s . l~~  
The public hearing also allows policyholders, public policy experts, and advocacy 
groups to shape the final transaction, assuring that the public's interest will be protected. 
The public process has brought out public interest groups such as Consumers Union, 
which led the fight against the California Blue Cross conversion.127 The public process 
does create problems in closing the transaction that are often muted or absent in typical 
business transactions where timing is more important than process. When the terms are 
made public, the emphasis on process comes to the fore, and the time frame of the trans- 
120. See Mark Tatge & Diane Solov, Insurance Watchdog Fought for Secrecy, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 21, 
1997, at 1G. 
121. See Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 687 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ohio 1997) (stating that documents 
relating to the proposed acquisition of Blue Cross are not exempt from disclosure under the "work papers" 
exception to the Public Records Act); see also Tatge, supra note 120, at IG. Among the more sought-after 
documents regulators kept secret were the details of the payout to the Blue Cross trustees. However, Blue 
Cross insisted that the board voted on their retirement largess before they approved the sale to Columbia 
HCA, thereby creating no conflict of interest. In fact, the board meeting approving the retirement benefits 
came three months after a board meeting authorizing the Chairman to sell Blue Cross to either Columbia or 
another company. In the aftermath of the collapse of the deal, six of the former trustees agreed to return $2.4 
million after they were sued. A seventh donated his retirement benefit to charity. See id. 
122. See COLO. REV. STAT. 5 10-16-324(3) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 109.34@) (Banks-Baldwin 
1997). 
123. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 8 1399.74 (West 1997); CAL. CORP. CODE 5 5916 (West 1997). 
124. Patricia A. Butler, Stale Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 
69,77. 
125. LOUS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
126. The merits of the conversion of the Ohio Blue Cross seemed lost in the millions the senior manage- 
ment was to receive from the transaction. 
127. See Eleanor Hamburger, et al., The Pot of Gold: Monitoring Health Care Conversions Can Yield 
Billions of Dollars for Healthcare, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE R V. 473,479-489 (1995). 
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action may be so lengthened and scru t in ized  that appropr ia te  conversions as we l l  as 
ques t ionable  ones may not come t o  frui t ion.  Recent state efforts to oversee conversions 
require part ies  to a convers ion  to d isc lose  to the regulator  a l l  terms of the transaction and 
a l l  confl icts  of interest.128 
California requires nonprofit organiza t ions  to notify the Commis s ione r  of Corpora- 
t ions  and the Attorney Genera l  in advance of a plan to convert,129 who must then hold at 
least  one publ ic  hearing in the hospital 's county, and p rov ide  a sixty-day per iod  w i th  one 
forty-five day extension to review the transaction.130 Nebraska requi res  a t  least thirty 
days notif icat ion of an impending acquisi t ion. l3l  If the attorney genera l  or state regulator 
does not have suff icient  notice of the transaction, the terms between the parties will be 
comple te ly  negotiated and s igned  in a contract, making the transact ion more difficult to 
~ n w i n d . l 3 ~  
Apart from the issue of the publ ic  hearing i s  the question whether state off icials  
shou ld  have an informal review process to explore whether the proposed transaction is a 
conversion and whether certain aspects are controversial  or impermissible.133 The prob- 
lem of informal advance r ev i ew  i s  that it may make the publ ic  hearings a charade. How- 
ever, informal or advance scrutiny is regularly used by federal agencies in the antitrust 
f ield in the form of "business r ev i ew  letters;"134 in federal  income tax through private 
letter rulings;l35 and in securities regulation through "no action" letters.136 
128. See NEB. REV. STAT. 5 71-20,108(4) (1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 1399.71(e)(2)(D). 
129. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 1399.71(a); CAL. COW. CODE 5 5914 (West 1997). See also 
NEB. REV. ST. 71-20,104 (1996). 
130. See CAL. COW. CODE 5 5915; see also NEB. REV. STAT. $5 71-20,107,20,106. 
13 1. See NEB. REV. STAT. Q 71-20,107; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 109.35 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
132. See Butler, supra note 124, at 76. 
133. See id. 
134. The leading treatise on anti-trust law states that: 
Although the Justice Department lacks the power to immunize transactions generally from the 
antitrust laws, it may "approve" a transaction by stating in a "business review letter" that on 
the basis of its present information it "has no present intention to challenge" the proposed ac- 
tion. Such a clearance cannot bind a court, a private plaintiff, or the Federal Trade Commission, 
although a court might choose to give it weight in the same way that it can consider enforce- 
ment guidelines. Nor would the Justice Department feel inhibited ffom seeking the usual reme- 
dies if the party requesting the clearance had submitted the inaccurate or incomplete informa- 
tion. 
I1 Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 5 331c, at 100-01 (rev. ed. 1995) 
135. A private letter ruling is a written statement issued to the taxpayer upon request, usually in advance 
of a proposed transaction in which the staff of the IRS interprets the tax laws to the specific set of facts pre- 
sented. The private letter ruling advises the taxpayer of the treatment she can expect from the situation in the 
fact pattern. Private letter rulings are directed only to the organization or individual requesting it and cannot 
be used or cited as precedent. See 1.R.C. 5 61 10(j)(3) (1997). 
136. Under SEC procedure, in certain circumstances an informal statement of the views of the Commis- 
sion may be obtained. See 17 C.F.R. 5 202.l(d) (1997). Typically, a "no action" letter reaffirms the informal 
advice provided by the staff to a company that is attempting to determine what properly may be omitted from 
its proxy materials. The letter does not bind the SEC to a particular course of action. See Roosevelt v. E.1. 
DuPont de Nemours, 958 F.2d 416,427 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that the letter does not amount to adju- 
dication or rulemaking). 
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A criticism is that state regulators may not obtain the necessary information in a 
timely fashion and in any case, may lack the capacity to analyze it.137 Another proposal, 
recommending the establishment of an SEC-type governmental body or a Charities 
Commission on the English model, was fust mentioned over 35 years ago.138 However, 
the American political ethos has moved away from establishing new governmental agen- 
cies. Yet another suggestion has been a mandatory disclosure system with collaboration 
among state charity reg~lators.l3~ At best, any such collaboration would be many years 
away, long after the conversion wave will have run its course. 
D. Financing 
Originally, sales of nonprofit hospitals to investor-owned chains were paid in cash. 
Today, most are asset sales, and the use of stock is the dominant financing model. Often 
the transaction is structured as a joint venture in which only a portion of the asset value is 
paid at the time of conversion, and the charitable organization becomes a partner of the 
for-profit. The for-profit actually runs the hospital and shares profits. 
HMOs have used a variety of sophisticated financing techniques involving various 
kinds of securities. In some cases, the terms of sale require as little as 50% of asset value 
to be paid on the closing date. The balance is paid with shares of stock in the new for- 
profit venture, which may place the charity at risk of economic losses. Recent indications 
are that conversions are facing growing resistance. Acquirers like ColumbialHCA, for 
instance, have come upon hard times.140 Its stock has declined over fifty percent in 
1997.l4I There are significant financial implications for these new foundations and or- 
ganizations that have received large amounts of stock as part of the consideration in the 
transaction. If the purchasing entity's stock collapses or there is a general market turn- 
down, the value of conversion-created foundations will substantially decline along with 
the amount these organizations will spend for the public good. 
137. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 12. 
138. See Kenneth Karst, The Eflciency of the Charitable Dollar: An UntlJilled State Responsibility, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 433,476-83 (1960) (discussing a proposal for a government agency to supervise and adminis- 
ter the system). 
139. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 11-12. 
140. The California attorney general objected to a joint venture between Columbia and Sharp Healthcare 
and threatened to hold nonprofit directors personally liable for undervaluing the chain by $100-200 million. 
The deal later unwound due to the objection. See Milt Freudenheim, California Challenges Deal on Nonprofit 
Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996, at 35; see also Anita Sharp & Rhonda L. Rundle, Columbio/HCA f 
California Expansion Falters as Sharp Healthcare Pact Foils, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at B8. An effort in 
Ohio to acquire Blue Cross was thwarted. For a description of some of the controversy facing Columbia, see 
Martin Gottlieb & Kurt Eichenwald, Health Care f Giant- When Hospitals Play Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, May 
11, 1997, 5 3, at 1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and several government agencies were examining 
some of the recent acquisitions and business practices of ColumbiaRICA. See Kurt Eichenwald, FBI Reported 
Examining Hospital Operation in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1997, at D2; Kurt Eichenwald, Columbia/HCA 
is Said to Settle Tar Case for $71 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at D4. 
14 1. The Valueline Investment Survey estimated in January of 1998 that "investors should look elsewhere 
for now." Markey, supra note 50, at 653. 
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E. How Much ofthe Organization's Value Should Remain in the Public Domain? 
What is a theoretical rationale for requiring assets to be set aside when there is a 
conversion? Jurisdictions differ over the theory of the benefits of tax exemption and over 
whether any assets must remain in the charitable stream. Should the amount of assets de- 
voted to public use be based on a tax benefit theory by which the set aside would be lim- 
ited to the value of tax benefits received by the organization plus interest, or should the 
traditional charitable trust theory (which would require that the value of all assets of the 
exempt organization be set aside) be applied? The differences in amount depending on 
the method of valuation could be enormous. 
When Blue Crosses have converted, typically they have used the drop-down ap- 
p r 0 a ~ h . l ~ ~  Thus, the insurance company becomes a for-profit subsidiary of the nonprofit 
parent. This technique was used in California when Blue Cross of California, the state's 
largest health insurer, created a for-profit subsidiary, Wellpoint Health Networks, and 
transferred to it a 423,000-member HMO, its 1.5 million-member preferred provider 
network, and the company's pharmacy, dental, mental health, senior, and workers' com- 
pensation programs. Blue Cross retained 82% of Wellpoint and sold the remainder for 
$5 17 million. At first, Blue Cross argued that because it did not convert itself to for-profit 
status, but only created a for-profit subsidiary, it owed nothing to the public. Although 
Blue Cross's argument was correct from a legal standpoint, it did not pass the "smell 
test," which led to a public outcry. Eventually, the Wellpoint subsidiary was sold to an- 
other HMO, creating two private foundations-the California Healthcare Foundation, 
with $2.2 billion in stock, and the California Endowment, with over $1 million in 
cash. 143 
This dispute has been played out in other jurisdictions with mixed results. In some 
jurisdictions, Blue Cross has attempted to shape state laws to make conversion easier and 
cheaper by eliminating the nonprofit Blue's responsibility to keep assets in the charitable 
stream.144 In other states, legislation has attempted to preserve the charitable assets upon 
conversion.145 Courts in Missouri and Georgia concluded that their state's Blues owed 
nothing to the public because they had lost their charitable e ~ e m ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  A back-up ar- 
gument in some jurisdictions has been that Blue Cross should return public monies that 
were received because of the tax exemption. For example, the set aside of monies to the 
public is limited to the tax benefit received by the organization plus interest. In Virginia, 
the legislature used the assets from the Blue Cross conversion for education funds, re- 
lieving the state's taxpayers and providing a refund to subscribers.147 
142. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. 
143. See Fishman & Schwartz, supra note 34 at 105-106. 
144. See N.J. REV. STAT. $5 17:48E, :48E-45, :48E-17 (1997). 
145. See COLO. REV. STAT. 5 10-16-324 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 5 194-A (West 1997). 
146. The Georgia court said that Blue Cross was not charitable because the company had been taxed since 
1960. In Missouri, a court granted summary judgment to Blue Cross, stating it owed nothing to the state. See 
Blue Cross Missouri Gains in Legal Fight with State Oficials, WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 10, 1996, at B2. Blue 
Crosses lost their federal tax exemptions in 1986. See I.RC. 5 501(m) (1986). 
147. See Butler, supra note 124, at 72; see also David Ress, Trigon Conversion Approved, RICHMOND 
TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1996, at C-1. 
Heinonline - -  23 J. Corp. L. 725 1997-1998 
726 The Journal of Corporation Law [Summer 
F. Who Should Regulate These Conversions-The Role of the Attorney General 
Historically, the attorney general in most states has had the responsibility of super- 
vision and oversight of charitable trusts and corporations. He may maintain such actions 
as appropriate to protect the public interest.148 Most jurisdictions, but not all, require at- 
torneys general to receive advance notice of organic changes such as conversions.149 The 
Volunteer Trustees Foundation for Research and Education, which has studied health 
care conversions, has recommended that the attorney general be primarily responsible 
for: 1) safeguarding the value of charitable assets; 2) safeguarding the community from 
loss of essential health services; and 3) assuring that proceeds of the transaction are used 
for appropriate charitable purposes. l 
The problem is that attorneys general have neither the resources nor the expertise to 
closely monitor these conversions. Health care providers may be supervised by other 
state agencies who certify, regulate, and oversee health providers, but the conversion 
phenomenon is potentially broader than the health care sector. For all practical purposes, 
charities are self-regulated.151 Only thirteen states have charities sections within attor- 
neys general 0 f f i ~ e s . l ~ ~  Additionally, there is limited standing for others to sue. Non- 
profits have no shareholders, and few charities have members. Generally, the public has 
no standing. 
What is needed is an increase in the leverage of state attorneys general. Giving at- 
torneys general explicit legislative authority over conversions neither adds to their budg- 
ets nor the size of their offices. One way to leverage inadequate staffing is to use the 
common law concept of the relator to challenge the terms of proposed transactions. A 
relator is a party who may or may not have a direct interest in a transaction, but who is 
permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the state when that right to sue resides 
148. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT~ORP. ACT 55 1.70,3.04, 8.10, 14.03-14.04 (1988); CAL. COW. CODE 
$5 5142,5250,651 1,9230 (West 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. L. 5 112 (McKinney 1997). 
149. See CAL. COW. CODE 5 5913; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 109.34(B) (Anderson 1997). 
150. See Robert A. Boisture & Douglas N. Varley, Stafe Attorneys General's Legal Authority to Police 
the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, in Selling Off the Nation's Not-for-Profit Hospitals: The Legal 
Basis for Oversight Tab 2, 16 (Sept. 19, 1995) (unpublished presentation) (on file with author). 
151. See Robert Abrams, Regulating Chariv-The State's Role, 35 REC. 481, 484 (1980); see also 
MARION FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 226-228 (1965). 
152. See PETER SWORDS & HARRIET BOGRAD, NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY (visited Apr. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.bway.net/-hbogradtcyb-acc.ht1. These states are home to 55% of the United States' charities 
and have 65% of national charitable revenues. Except for New Hampshire and New Jersey, all have more than 
two full-time attorneys. "Integrated" state attorney general offices generally provide registration and reporting 
systems for charities and for professional fundraisers; an enforcement program that includes inquiries, investi- 
gations, negotiations, and litigation to protect charitable assets and prevent fundraising abuse; educational 
programs to promote more responsible board governance andlor to prevent fundraising fraud; and oversight of 
charitable trusts or bequests. Some, but not all, of these offices also oversee certain structural changes such as 
mergers, dissolutions, or major transfers of assets. Many of these offices have self-sustaining budgets, sup- 
ported by fairly modest registration and reporting fees. The second most common pattern is for one state 
agency to handle charitable registration and reporting, while the attorney general's office handles enforce- 
ment. The agency responsible for overseeing charitable solicitations may be the secretary of state, the con- 
sumer protection agency, or an agency that deals with registration and licensing. In ten states, there is no gen- 
eral system of registration and reporting for charities. Of these, Texas still has an actively staffed charities 
office within the state anomey general's office, and Iowa has an active program of prosecuting solicitation 
fraud. See id. 
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solely in the attorney generaL153 Thus, to expand the resources of the attorney general, 
an action would be brought by a private party, such as a public interest law firm, on be- 
half of the public interest or the state. The attorney general still would exercise ultimate 
control over the litigation. In order to recover litigation expenses incurred by the private 
party, such as attorneys' fees, legislation needs to be enacted. 
G. The Internal Revenue Service's Role 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may become interested if the transaction vio- 
lates the private inurement or private benefit proscriptions of the Code. The conversion 
process may provide directors, officers or employees with private inurement through 
transactions that improperly benefit management, such as golden parachutes, or under- 
value the nonprofit entity when it is sold to a for-profit successor whose owners include 
managers of the n0npr0fit.l~~ 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in activities that result 
in "inurement" of the organization's net earnings to insiders, such as founders, directors, 
and officers.155 Related to the private inurement proscription is the "private benefit" 
doctrine that prohibits a section 501(c)(3) organization from providing a substantial eco- 
nomic benefit to individuals, such as employees, who do not exercise any formal control 
over the organization.lS6 Thus, the inurement limitation applies only to an organization's 
insiders whose special relationship to the organization affords them an opportunity to 
benefit economically from the organization's income or assets.157 The private benefit 
doctrine is founded on the principle that a charity must serve public rather than private 
interests. The private benefit prohibition applies to anyone outside of the intended chari- 
table class, whether or not they are insiders. As interpreted by the IRS, a private benefit 
must be more than incidental, in contrast to the absolute ban on private inurement.lS8 
Until recently, even if the private inurement or private benefit proscriptions oc- 
curred in a conversion context, the only remedy was to revoke the exemption of the hos- 
pital. Although this remedy would penalize holders of tax exempt paper and change the 
financial valuation of the hospital, it would result in very little damage if the hospital was 
converting to for-profit status. Revocation of exemption for an isolated instance of in- 
urement even on a transaction as qualitatively and quantitatively significant as a conver- 
sion was vastly disproportionate to the offense. In 1996, Congress passed intermediate 
sanctions legislation to impose excise tax sanctions short of revocation when excessive 
153. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and An Agenda for Reform, 
34 EMORY L.J. 617,671-674 (1985). 
154. See Singer, supra note 5 I, at 246. 
155. Treas. Reg. 1.501(a)-1 (1997) specifies that an organization is not operated exclusively for one or 
more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or in- 
dividuals. The regulators define "private shareholder or individual" as any person "having a personal and 
private interest in the activities of the organization." Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982). 
156. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(~)(3)-l(d)(l). 
157. But see United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 326 (1997), where the inurement limitation was 
extended beyond the organization's insiders. 
158. For the distinction in the context of joint ventures between tax exempt hospitals and private physi- 
cians, see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991). 
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economic benefits were provided to insiders-such as officers, directors, or employees of 
conver t ing  nonprofits. lS9 
The sanct ion,  which is intermediate in the sense of being lesser than revocation, im- 
poses an excise tax i f  there is an excess benef i t  t r a n s a ~ t i o n ' ~ ~  between the exempt or- 
ganization and a disqualified person.161 The initial penal ty is 25% of the "excess bene- 
fit" imposed on the disqualified person.162 Penalties may also be imposed on one or 
more of the organizat ion 's  managers.163 It is likely that some of the more egregious 
payments, bonuses, options and rewards could be recaptured under the intermediate 
sanct ions legislation. 
Thus, the Intemal Revenue Service has the authori ty to prevent private inurement so 
as to ensure an adequate purchase price. Even prior to the addi t ion  of section 4958, the 
IRS had indicated its concern w i t h  conflicts of interest in the hea l th  care area.164 It does 
not, however, have the authority to require advance approval except for joint ventures 
between for-profit  and nonprof i t  organizat ions.  The Service has indicated it will pay 
closer at tent ion to mergers between for-profit and nonprofi t  health care organizations in 
the 1998 fiscal year.165 Even if it desires to take a more active role, the IRS is faced with 
decreasing The Exempt Organizations Division superv ises  1.2 million non- 
profits w i th  only 400 agents and a budget of $62 m i 1 l i 0 n . l ~ ~  T h i s  works out to six agents 
for every 3,000 nonprofit ~ rgan iza t ions .~~~  
159. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79 (1996) (adding section 
4958 to the Internal Revenue Code). 
160. An "excess benefit transaction" is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided directly 
by the organization or indirectly by a controlled entity, such as a taxable subsidiary to a disqualified person if 
the value of the economic benefit exceeds the value of the consideration received by the organization for pro- 
viding the benefit. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(l) (1997). 
161. A disqualified person is any person who, at any time during the five-year period preceding the excess 
benefit transaction was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization." 
I.R.C. 5 4958(f)(l)(A). 
162. See I.R.C. 4958(a)(l). 
163. See I.R.C. 8 4958(a)(2). Additional second tier penalties up to 200% of the excess benefit can be 
imposed on the disqualified person if the violation is not corrected within a specified period of time. See 
I.R.C. 4958(b). 
164. See Charles F. Kaiser & T.J. Sullivan, Integrated Delivery Systems and Health Care Update, in 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 384, 396 (Intemal Revenue Service Continuing Professional Education Technical 
Instruction Program 1996). 
165. See Fred Stokeld, Health Care Mergers to Get More Attention from IRS, Says Owens, 18 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 195 (1997). 
166. In 1997, Congress cut the agency's budget 10.5%, or nearly $774 million from the 1996 fiscal year's 
level of funding. See Christopher Georges, House Approves Deep Cutbacks in IRS Funds, WALL ST. J., July 
18, 1996, at A14. 
167. IRS Exempt Organization officials devote about 30% of their resources to the largest nonprofits, 
principally hospitals and universities. The IRS's primary functions are to: (1) collect taxes; (2) manage appli- 
cations for tax exempt status and the annual report; (3) provide a Form 990 reporting system; (4) audit; (5) 
investigate; and (6) enforce. See SWORDS & BOGRAD, supra note 152. Less than one-half of one percent of 
exempt organizations are examined each year, and the number of examinations fell from 7,541 in 1989 to 
5,472 in 1993. House Ways & Means Comm., Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Report on Reforms 
to Improve the Tax Rules Governing Public Charities, 94 TNT 89-7, 111 (May 5, 1994). 
168. In contrast, the Securities and Exchange Commission supervises approximately nine to fourteen 
thousand corporations with a substantially larger budget. See SWORDS & BOGRAD, supra note 152. 
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It may be that the greatest impact of the intermediate sanctions legislation will be to 
encourage the creation of a procedural paper trail as a bulwark against a violation of sec- 
tion 4958. The House Report and the proposed regulations state that the parties to a 
transaction are entitled to rely on a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect 
to a compensation arrangement with a disqualified person if such arrangement was ap- 
proved by a disinterested board, who obtained and relied upon appropriate data of com- 
parable arrangements and adequately documented the basis for its dete1minati0n.l~~ 
Thus, the game for counsel of nonprofit employees who may benefit from conversion 
transactions will be to follow procedures to shift the burden of proof to the 1 ~ s . l ~ ~  All in 
all, oversight principally will remain on the state level. 
H. The New Foundations 
It has been noted that when a nonprofit converts, the purchase money must remain 
in the charitable strearn.l7l There have been several approaches to handling the consid- 
eration generated by these transactions. One has been to create a new private foundation; 
another to create or affiliate with a public charity; a third, to distribute assets to other tax 
exempt charities; and fourth, to place the resulting assets in the state treasury. The first 
approach has been most common, as several enormous foundations have been formed by 
the conversion of nonprofit health care institutions. 
Approximately ninety foundations in all have been formed since 1990 through con- 
versions, though it is difficult to obtain accurate f i g u r e ~ . ' ~ ~  These foundations represent 
the "pay back" in the words of one foundation executive on a community's years of in- 
vestment in a health care f a ~ i 1 i t y . l ~ ~  Some of the new foundations are immense, such as 
the two foundations created from the conversion of California Blue Cross demonstrate. 
The California Wellness Foundation, formed in 1992 from the conversion of the HMO 
Health Net, has assets of $1.2 bi11ion.l~~ The Rose Foundation, formed in the aftermath 
of the sale of Rose Hospital in Denver, has assets of $185 rni11ion.l~~ In Dickson, Ten- 
nessee, a very small city, the foundation created from a local hospital conversion has as- 
sets of $80 mi11ion.l~~ Foundations are required to spend five percent of their endowment 
annually on direct support or grants.177 Although a foundation with $50 million in assets 
sounds enormous, its annual charitable spending may be less than $2.5 million. These 
169. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57 (1996). Prop. Treas. Reg. 53.4958-6. 
170. In the for-profit arena of takeovers, the major impact of the seminal case of Smith v. VanGorkom, 488 
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), has been to create procedural steps which boards follow to meet the demands of the 
duty of care. 
17 1.  See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
172. See Meyer, supra note 1; see also Domenica Marchetti, Redefining Health Philanthrom, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, July 24, 1997, at 1, 12 (recognizing 79 foundations and stating that others are being formed). 
173. Craig Havighurst, Solid Foundations, HEALTH SYS. REV., July-Aug. 1996, at 33-37. 
174. See Harris Meyer, From Giving Care to Giving Grants, 37 FDN. NEWS & COMMENTARY NO. 4, 40 
(JulyIAug. 1996). 
175. See Domencia Marchetti, Redefining Health Philanthropy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 24, 1997, at 
1. 
176. See Tamar Lewin & Martin Gottlieb, Health Care Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1997, 5 1, at 1; 
Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Generous to a Fault? Fledging Charities Get Billionsfrom the Sales ojNon- 
projr Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.  
177. See IRC 5 4942(e) (1997). The five percent figure includes administrative expenses. 
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new health care foundations, despite their seemingly enormous size, will not solve the 
problems of providing adequate health care to the poor, financing a cure for cancer, or 
making up for government cutbacks.178 
Several problems have arisen. The formation of the foundation comes well after the 
deal has been finalized-almost as an afterthought. The community or public is not in- 
volved at any earlier point. After the formation, there has been little focus on what foun- 
dations are actually Derek Bok, the former president of Harvard, has recently 
written, "Of all the institutions in America, philanthropic foundations are surely among 
the least a~countable . ' ' l~~ States do not really monitor much after the foundation has 
been formed.lS1 They seem to assume the IRS is doing so. However, as discussed above, 
that is unlikely given the scope of the Service's brief and its lack of resources in the ex- 
empt organization area. 
Many of the new foundations have no experience in philanthropic activity. There 
has been no rush to turn the assets over to existing community foundations, which would 
reduce administrative costs and provide A very real problem for philan- 
thropy is spending such large sums of money effectively. Many of the new foundations 
are run by the former trustees of the originating HMO or hospital. These individuals 
hardly have the independence one would wish, which may be more important than phil- 
anthropic experience. Basically, foundations only have to answer to their trustees. The 
majority of boards are not composed of a cross-section of the community.183 The phil- 
anthropic records of some of these new foundations give pause: 
-The public benefit program run by Blue Cross of California exclusively funneled 
subsidies for covering uninsured children to its affiliated ~ ~ 0 . l ~ ~  
-When Colorado Trust was first established as the result of the sale of Denver's 
PresbyterianISt. Luke's Medical Center in 1985, the trust's board, made up of doctors 
and officials from the hospital, heavily steered funding to the h0s~ i t a1 . l~~  
-St. Luke's Charitable Health Trust in Phoenix, formed from the sale of a hospital, 
started out by funding charity care to that hospital after it was ~ 0 n v e r t e d . l ~ ~  
- - 
178. See Michele Bitoun Blecher, Show Us the Money, HEALTH & HOSP. NETWORKS, June 20, 1997, at 
52, available in LEXIS, Health Library, HOSP File (stating that "the needs of the uninsured represent a black 
hole that new foundations simply cannot fill"); see also Meyer, supra note 1, at 30. 
179. See Harris Meyer, From Giving Care to Giving Grants, FOUNDATION EWS & COMMENTARY, July- 
Aug. 1996, at 40. 
180. Derek Bok, Mute Inglorious Wizarh, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, 8 7, at 42. 
181. One exception is California. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text. 
182. See Nancy M. Kane, Some Guidelines for Managing Charitable Assetsfrom Conversions, HEALTH 
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 229. In the earliest HMO conversions in California the charitable proceeds were used 
to underwrite government programs, particularly Medical, California's Medicaid program. Id. 
183. Massachusetts has been in the forefront of regulating both the conversions and the creation of foun- 
dations. The attorney general has taken a supervisory role in the establishment of the foundations and has 
backed community groups who have demanded a role in board formation and goals development. 
184. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Philanthropy: Big Charities Born as Health Plans Go For-Profit, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 4, 1995, at B 1. 
185. See Meyer, supra note 179. 
186. See Meyer, supra note 179, at 43 (commenting on the performance of some foundations, which has 
exacerbated worries about the independence of new charities and potential favoritism in their grant making). 
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I. Cy Pres Issues Relating to the New Foundations 
Do the new foundations have continuing responsibilities for health care or can they 
broaden their mission to anything?lg7 Under traditional cy pres analysis, if there was a 
hospital conversion, the assets would have to be used for the delivery of primary health 
care as provided by a hospital. This may include health care for the poor.188 
New York has a more liberal approach to cy pres as applied to a nonprofit corpora- 
tion than does charitable trust law. It allows for distribution to organizations engaged in 
substantially similar activities and leaves it to the board of directors to determine to 
whom the distribution should be made. This means that assets given upon dissolution to 
an organization need only be contributed to an entity that has "substantially similar ac- 
t i ~ i t i e s . " ' ~ ~  This loose phrasing can cause much mischief as both the "substantially 
similar" and the corporate standards are quite vague.lgO 
The question arises-are these new foundations supposed to take over charitable 
services of existing money-losing hospitals and HMOs, by providing for the uninsured 
and assuming the charity care that the old nonprofit hospital or HMO may have pro- 
vided? In the absence of an agreement, the for-profit successor will provide less charity 
care than the nonprofit hospital.191 The for-profit hospital will often claim that it no 
longer has responsibilities for charity care; rather that is the responsibility of the founda- 
tion created in the aftermath of the conversion. 
187. About two-thirds of new foundations focus exclusively on public health and health care projects, 
while most of the remainder have broadened their focus to education, the arts, and other community projects. 
See Meyer, supra note 1, at 84. 
188. In California, cases support the proposition that a corporation organized exclusively for charitable 
purposes holds its assets in trust for the purposes enumerated in its articles of incorporation even if the assets 
were not expressly earmarked for charitable purposes when the corporation acquired them. Lynch v. Spilman, 
62 Cal.Rptr. 12, 20, 431 P.2d 636, 644 (1967). When a bequest, devise, or donation is made to a charitable 
corporation in California, the organization is expected to apply it to the charitable purposes set forth in its arti- 
cles of association. See Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 136 Cal.Rptr. 36, 41 (1977). Therefore, in the 
usual hospital conversion, even though the operating assets of a charitable hospital have been sold to a for- 
profit corporation, a strict constructionist view of cy pres would require the corporation to use the proceeds to 
cany out the charity's original purpose. See generally Silk, supra note 73, at 746.13; see also A m .  Gen. v. 
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 101 1, 1018-20 (Mass. 1996). 
189. See generally In re Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986). 
190. The new California statute regulating conversions states that the entity created in the course of a 
conversion be a section 501(c)(3) organization, but the statute does not really address the cy pres issue. CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE g 1399.72(2). 
191. One reason that nonprofits provide more unreimbursed care is that many states condition the property 
tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals on providing a substantial amount of charity care. See generally Utah 
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (affirming a County board of Equaliza- 
tion's denial of property tax exemption of two nonprofit hospitals because of failure to sufficiently demon- 
strate they met criteria for being a charity). In 1986, one year after the Hospital Corporation of America ac- 
quired Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City, charity care at the hospital dropped to $165,000 from $1.9 
million the previous year. However, as a for-profit hospital, Presbyterian now paid $629,554 in property and 
franchise taxes, $639,484 in local and state sales taxes, and $397,152 in state income taxes. Additionally, the 
Presbyterian Health Foundation, which was created out of the conversion, made thirty-three grants for 
$653,722 that year. This constitutes nearly 90% of the grants given to the University of Oklahoma Health Sci- 
ence Center where the hospital and foundation are located. Jay Greene, Charify Care Falls Afer Okla. Hos- 
pital's Sole, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 13, 1995, at 36, available at 1995 WL 2495215. 
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In California, a dispute arose between the attorney general and the Good Samaritan 
Charitable Trust in San Jose over the use of $53 million. The money was received from 
the sale of Good Samaritan Health System, specifically for physician and hospital care 
for the needy. The former hospital leaders in charge of the resulting foundation wanted to 
fund a wider variety of programs than primary health care including meals-on-wheels 
and a health library.192 The California Attorney General's position was that primary 
health care was the purpose of the original trust for which the money was raised and that 
use must ~ 0 n t i n u e . l ~ ~  In the Family Health Program conversion discussed at the com- 
mencement of this essay, the foundation endowed three chairs in medical schools in Cali- 
fornia, Utah, and Guam. Board members of foundations who believe that the new foun- 
dation should continue the charitable services have funneled support to their former 
hospitals but not to other health ~ r 0 v i d e r s . l ~ ~  However, legally, morally, and socially, 
these foundations should be independent. In fact, the trustees of these new foundations 
are almost all members of former hospital boards. 
Another issue is whether these new foundations should make grants completely out- 
side of the healthcare area. Some trustees of these newly created foundations want to 
move away from the illness side, such as direct medical care. In Los Gatos, California, 
twenty percent of Valley Foundation's $2 million in grants went to the arts. The Jackson 
Foundation, born from the sale of Regional Medical Center in Dickson, Tennessee, is 
considering financing a sports-training complex, an arts center, and a foreign language 
program. It provided two airplanes and made pilot training a free elective at the local 
high scho01.l~~ 
The Rose Medical Center in Denver, formed in the 1940s as a place where Jewish 
doctors could practice, was sold to the ColumbiaIHCA chain, creating a $170 million 
foundation. It has sponsored a Jewish community festival with music by the Borsht 
Brothers band and an Anne Frank contest in schools. The California Wellness Founda- 
tion gave money for Little League baseball in South Los Angeles, a world music festival, 
public education campaigns on handgun violence, and on how the Republicans "Contract 
with America" would cripple federal programs that help ~ h i 1 d r e n . l ~ ~  
These are complicated issues about which it is difficult to come to concrete answers 
beyond suggesting: 1) a majority of the trustees should not be affiliated with the former 
nonprofit or for-profit successor; and 2) in determining the foundation's mission, there 
should be some public input and representation on the board. For example, for the first 
192. See Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Generous to a Fault? Fledgling Charities Get Billionsj?om the 
Sale ofNonprofit Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al. 
193. The Trust agreed to make 45% of its annual distributions for in-patient hospital care; 31% for out- 
patient care; 14.3% for school health centers that provide free care to poor children, and the remaining 9.7% 
on general health issues. Marchetti, supm note 172, at 15. 
194. The Edgewater Foundation created from a hospital conversion reputedly spent $900,000 in its first 
five years settling two of the hospital's malpractice suits and paying its water bills as well as unemployment 
insurance. See Kane, supm note 182, at 233. The Colorado Trust awarded 40% of its grants in its first six 
years to the for-profit hospital who purchased the former nonprofit hospital. See id. When the for-profit de- 
cided to reconvert to nonprofit status, the foundation gave the hospital $60 million, half in grant and half in 
subordinated debt to support the reconversion. See id. at 233; see also, Bruce Japsen, CEO Profits as Hospital 
Changes Status-Again, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 9, 1995, at 50. 
195. See Japsen, supra note 194, at 50. 
196. See Marchetti, supra note 172, at 14. 
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five years of the foundation's existence, there should be a representative of the attorney 
general on the board. Public representatives on the boards of private institutions are not 
unknown. New York City appoints a representative to the board of the Metropolitan Mu- 
seum of Art and Carnegie Hall because the City contributes a percentage of the organi- 
zations' budget. Perhaps a relator who brought an action on behalf of the public would be 
an appropriate appointment. 
Although the looser New York approach for charitable corporations seems best 
suited,lg7 no matter what cy pres standard is used, the foundation's mission should be 
restricted to health care as it is defined by experts in the field. Thus, borscht, a Russian 
beet soup, would be allowable, but not the Borscht Brothers band! It should be required 
that foundations over a certain size-$50 million-be required to have professional man- 
agement and have its trustees receive training in foundation stewardship and public re- 
~ ~ o n s i b i 1 i t y . l ~ ~  The office responsible for oversight of the conversion should be given a 
monitoring role for the first five years of the foundation's existence. This would mean 
that the foundation would be expected to file a copy of its 990PF annual report to the IRS 
and the Attorney General. 
J. Politics and the Conversion Process 
One of the most disturbing, yet unsurprising aspects of the state of conversions is 
how the wheels of the political process have been greased by the large flow of funds to 
decisionrnakers. In the course of the conversion of Virginia's Trigon Blue CrossBlue 
Shield to for-profit status in January 1996, the Virginia House majority leader resigned as 
Trigon's counsel after it was uncovered that he received $179,000 in legal fees in 1994 
during the period negotiations were going on over the price of the conversion.199 In 
Georgia, Blue Shield of Georgia was approved for conversion to for-profit status by the 
insurance commissioner amidst criticism that special interests behind the conversion fi- 
nanced his campaign. No transfer of assets to a charitable foundation was required in that 
conversion. The largest contributor to a candidate running for the Georgia Secretary of 
State, who lost, received most of his support fiom entities he helped in the controversial 
conversion process to for-profit status.200 
Investor-owned hospitals have long been more politically active than nonprofit hos- 
p i t a l ~ . ~ ~ ~  When ColumbialHCA enters markets in pursuit of an acquisition, it retains the 
best legal talent; identifies allies among the local civic, political, and medical elite; and 
spreads around lots of money. In 1995, ColumbiaIHCA had thirty-three lobbyists in Tal- 
lahassee, Florida alone!202 
197. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text. 
198. The $50 million figure is derived from the cut-off size by the Association of Smaller Foundations. 
Such a requirement would most likely be negotiated by the attorney general. 
199. See Milt Freudenheim, Blue Cross Groups Seek Profit, and States Ask Share of Riches, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 1996, at Al;  Spencer S. Hsu & Peter Baker, Va. Delegate Quits as Insurer's Attorney, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 19, 1996, at B3. 
200. See Peter Mantius, Secretary of State Contest is Costliest Ever, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 8, 
1996, at 2C. As noted previously, Georgia Blue Cross owed nothing to the public. See supra note 146; see 
also Andy Miller, Questions for Bowers on Blue Cross Deal, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Dec. 26, 1997, at E3. 
201. See Gray, supra note 38, at 22. 
202. See Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA + Resurgence of For-profit Hospital Business, NEW ENG. J. 
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After years of lobbying in state capitals because their rates were set by insurance 
commissioners or some other agency, Blue Crosses have become particularly sophisti- 
cated at getting support for conversions.203 The interests seeking to convert nonprofit 
entities to for-profit status are bound only by the laws governing political contributions. 
However, nonprofit organizations, particularly those seeking to stop these conversions, 
are strictly limited in the lobbying and legislative actions they can pursue, and are largely 
unsophisticated. While investor-owned chains, such as ColumbiaIHCA, have generated a 
backload of unfavorable publicity, the long term political influence remains. 
VIII. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO CONVERSIONS 
Traditional fiduciary legal doctrines, such as the duty of care, the business judgment 
rule, the duty of obedience, and the duty of loyalty, can protect the public's interest in 
these transactions with the addition of some statutory assistance. An analogy can be 
drawn to the jurisprudence of management buyouts, tender offers, and other changes in 
control. These kinds of "organic changes," that is, a fundamental shift in operation, con- 
trol, or structure, have received increased scrutiny by the courts, particularly in Dela- 
ware-the most important corporate law jurisdiction. 
A. The Duty of Care 
Directors and officers are required to discharge the duties of their respective posi- 
tions in good faith and with the degree of diligence, care, and skill which ordinary pm- 
dent persons would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.204 Broadly 
stated, a director can neglect her duty of care in two ways: 1) failing to properly monitor 
or supervise the corporate entity-the duty of attention; or 2) so long as the director is 
disinterested, independent and acting in good faith, by failing to make an informed deci- 
sion about an important transaction or fundamental change in the way the corporate en- 
tity operates-the duty of informed decisionmaking. For purposes of this article, the lat- 
ter is most important. 
In the context of a nonprofit corporation, practical elements of informed decision- 
making would include the following: 
1) the opportunity to hear a detailed presentation by management, accompanied by 
written materials if appropriate, explaining the rationale for the proposed decision and 
why management is making the particular recommendation; 
2) the opportunity to hear the advice and recommendation of recognized outside ex- 
perts, including legal counsel, on the subject; 
3) the opportunity to debate and deliberate on the proposal at the board level and, if 
possible, to allow a period of several days or weeks for reflection and further considera- 
tion before requiring a vote; 
4) the gathering of information (where appropriate) from comparable institutions 
about how they had dealt with similar situations; and 
MEDICME, August 1, 1996, at 448. 
203. See Gray, supra note 38, at 22. 
204. See PRMCIPLE~ OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 4.01 (1994). 
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5) the opportunity to request any additional information deemed relevant by a di- 
rector from management or outside experts, including legal counsel, and time for the di- 
rectors to consider such additional information. 
If the board exercises a duty of care in reaching a decision, and the directors are free 
from any conflict of interest with their decisions, then the outcome, even if disastrous to 
the organization, will be protected by the business judgment rule, or in the nonprofit 
context, the best judgment rule. 
B. The Business Judgment Rule as a Safe Harbor for Directors 
The Business Judgment Rule raises "a presumption that in making a business deci- 
sion, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company."205 However, 
the board must exercise the duty of care. The Business Judgment Rule does not protect 
decisions by board members who have breached their duty of care by failing to obtain 
sufficient information to make an informed decision.206 
Delaware cases have given special scrutiny to transactions in which control of the 
company will change hands.207 The reason that courts have required enhanced scrutiny 
has been the fear that management will regard more favorably those offers that benefit 
themselves rather than the interests of shareholders or the corporation. This is human 
nature and a subject as much for psychology as for law. Healthcare conversions demon- 
strate that nonprofit managers are no different than their corporate counterparts, and self- 
interest is a major motivating factor. 
C. The Duty of Loyalty 
A director owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation on whose board he servese208 
This duty requires a director to act in a manner that does not harm the corporation. It 
further requires a director to avoid using their position to improperly obtain a benefit for 
herself or an advantage which might more properly belong to the corporation. That a 
transaction involves interested parties is less significant than whether it was fair to the 
corporation at the time the decision was made and whether the decision was reached in 
an impartial board environment. The fact that a nonprofit's officers or managers will 
participate in the for-profit entity is not in and of itself a reason to prohibit the transac- 
tion. However, if there is a conflict of interest, the burden is on the directors or senior ex- 
ecutives to prove the fairness of the t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
205. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984). 
206. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In that case the directors breached the duty of care 
by not considering and informing themselves adequately about a sale or the chief executive oficer's role in 
promoting the transaction. The board did not independently attempt to value the company, and the decision 
was made too quickly to reach an informed judgment. Id. at 874-75. 
207. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount Com- 
munications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
208. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PART V, DUTY OF FAIR DEALING (1992). 
209. Cj PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATlONS 8 5.02 (1992). 
6 5.02 Transactions with the Corporation (a) General Rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a 
transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills the 
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Corporate law has developed procedures to insulate the interested directors from ap- 
proving the transaction. When a potential change of control occurs, the board typically 
will establish a special committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the transaction.210 
This committee will retain its own counsel, investment bankers, and other advisers. This 
process-oriented approach ensures a deliberative disinterested decision that will benefit 
the corporation's shareholders. 
duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if: 
(1) Disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is made to the corporate decisionmaker 
who authorizes in advance or ratifies the transaction; and 
(2) either: 
(A) The transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; 
(B) The transaction is authorized in advance, following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the 
transaction, by disinterested supervisor, who could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to 
the corporation at the time of such authorization; 
(C) The transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested directors who could have reasona- 
bly have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into, provided (I) 
a corporate decisionmaker who is not interested in the transaction acted for the corporation in the transaction 
and could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation; (ii) the interested direc- 
tor or senior executive made disclosure to such decisionmaker pursuant to Subsection (a)(l) to the extent he or 
she then knew of the material facts; (iii) the interested director or senior executive did not act unreasonably in 
failing to seek advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior; 
and (iv) the failure to obtain advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinter- 
ested superior did not adversely affect the interests of the corporation in a significant way; or 
@) The transaction is authorized in advance or ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested share- 
holders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time of the shareholder action. 
(b) Burden of Proof. A party who challenges a transaction between a director or senior executive and the cor- 
poration has the burden of proof, except that if such party establishes that none of Subsections (a)(2)(B), 
(a)(2)(C), or (a)(2)(D) is satisfied, the director or senior executive has the burden of proving that the transac- 
tion was fair to the corporation. 
(c) Ratification of Disclosure of Nondisclosure. The disclosure requirements of 5 5.02(a)(l) will be deemed to 
be satisfied if at any time (but no later than a reasonable time after suit is filed challenging the transaction) the 
transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by the directors, the shareholders, or the corporate decision- 
maker who initially approved the transaction or the decisionmaker's successor. 
4 5.02. Courts have recognized instances such as a change of control where boards of directors may not be 
able to exercise their business judgment properly. Because of the omnipresent possibility that a board may be 
acting in its own interests in a change of control situation in either opposing or supporting such a transaction, 
rather than the interests of the corporation and the shareholders, courts have found an enhanced fiduciary duty 
on the board. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946,954 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications v. 
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,43 (Del. 1993). If a board uses outside investment advisors and a majority 
of the directors are outside directors, a court is more likely to support management's action. See Unocal, 493 
A.2d at 952-56. 
210. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985), the court outlined in detail the fiduciary missteps 
of a badly informed board in considering a change of control. In the aftermath of that case, courts, practitio- 
ners, and scholars developed techniques to assist judicial approval of management actions. See Bayless Man- 
ning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom AJer Van Gorkom, 45 Bus. L. 1, 8-14 (1985) 
(describing steps that should be taken to gain protection of the business judgment rule). Two of the common 
procedures to establish a fair price are the solicitation of a fairness opinion from an investment bank and the 
appointment of a special committee of independent directors to negotiate on behalf of the corporation and the 
shareholders. See Richard Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare and the Limits of Fiduciary 
Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L.REv. 630, 657 (1985); Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee- 
Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other 
Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 BUS. L. 665 (1988). 
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The chances that a nonprofit board will be taken advantage of and that the charity 
will fail to receive maximum value in these transactions is greater than with a business 
corporation. This results from the dynamics of nonprofit boards. Most boards of charita- 
ble organizations are of a nonadversarial nature, and probing questions are viewed as a 
manifestation of bad manners. Secondly, there is a tradition of inattentive or token di- 
rectors-individuals who are selected for their prestige, name recognition, or affluence, 
who have little time to devote to the organization. Virtually all charitable boards consist 
of volunteers, who may not have the vested interest that business corporate directors 
have. More important in the conversion context is that nonprofit boards have little acqui- 
sition experience and, unlike many for-profit directors, have been selected for reasons 
wholly unrelated to their ability to obtain fair v a l ~ e . ~ I l  They simply are not in the same 
league as the acquirers. 
Nonprofit boards are unaccustomed to and may be wary of spending scarce re- 
sources on investment bankers, accountants, major law f m s ,  or other intermediaries that 
are the glue of for-profit changes in control. Unlike their business counterparts, nonprofit 
boards and their organizations exist in the shade. They are not subject to the same scru- 
tiny as for-profit corporations of similar size. There are no shareholders or stock. Nothing 
in nonprofit governance resembles the requirement of shareholder approval of changes in 
control or the sale of assets because most charities are non-membership  organization^.^^^ 
Disclosure requirements for nonprofit organizations seeking access to capital markets are 
less stringent than requirements for for-profit organizations. Nonprofit boards are unfa- 
miliar with valuation and the newer techniques of determining asset worth. In the case of 
HMOs, it may be impossible to find disinterested directors. 
There is a philosophical question in the conversion context-whom do the boards 
represent: patients, the doctors, a part of the public and which sector, or the community 
as a whole? It is unclear whether board members know. This is a particularly important 
issue with HMOs where boards have not been community-oriented. 
IX. DEALING WITH THE CONVERSIONS: THE STANDARD OF ENHANCED SCRUTINY 
Nonprofit organizations faced with a conversion should be subject to enhanced 
board scrutiny and fiduciary responsibility analogous to the heightened scrutiny that 
Delaware courts have imposed upon directors of business corporations in the change of 
control context. Courts need to create appropriate or special standards of conduct in the 
conversion context and appropriately rigorous standards of judicial review.213 Directors 
must engage expert independent outside counsel, seek to consider all alternatives, attempt 
to obtain competing offers whenever possible through a market test, and consider com- 
21 1 .  See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 1. 
212. This does not mean that the organization, for example a museum or symphony, does not have mem- 
bers, but in a legal sense they are merely preferred customers. They do not possess the legal indicia of mem- 
bership, such as the right to elect directors, sue on behalf of the corporation, or the right to residual value of 
the corporation upon dissolution. 
213. "A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A 
standard of review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether 
to impose liability or grant injuncture relief." WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 
602 (7th ed. unabridged 1995). 
Heinonline - -  23 J. Corp. L. 737 1997-1998 
738 The Journal of Corporation Law [Summer 
munity needs. The Delaware standard of care is gross negligence.214 Directors must ex- 
ercise their duty of inquiry and proceed through a deliberate decisionmaking process. 
Directors must disclose all conflicts of interest. They should recuse themselves fiom 
voting or participating in decisions in which they have a conflict. When this is impossi- 
ble, as in the case of an HMO which may have no outside directors, conflicts should be 
measured by a standard of intrinsic fairness and the burden of proof should be upon the 
interested directors to show fairness. When the board faces decisions and some directors 
are interested, the organization should form an independent committee of disinterested 
directors. The attached recommendations may not, and should not, prevent conversions, 
but will slow them down, requiring their evaluation with the care and scrutiny the public 
interest deserves. 
214. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 @el. 1985). However, the gross negligence stan- 
dard is not without criticism. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1210, uvail- 
able in 1987 W L  28436 (Del. Ch. 1987). The gross negligence standard is not without criticism. In Wilson v. 
Brett, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843), Baron Rolfe defined gross negligence as the same thing as ordinary 
negligence "with the addition of a vituperative epithet." 
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A. The Conversion Transaction 
Advanced court approval in a cy pres proceeding to convert, sell, or enter into 
whole hospital or HMO joint ventures with for-profit entities 
Detailed public disclosure of the terms of the transaction 
Community Benefit Impact Statement 
A public Hearing on the impact of the transaction on the delivery of health care 
in the community 
Specification in the transaction agreement on the continuation of existing health 
care, particularly charity care 
Provisions for monitoring, independent auditing of health care delivery, and an 
enforcement mechanism 
Reimbursement of all valuation, attorney, and investment banking fees incurred 
by the attorney general or relators 
B. Attorney General Intercession 
Automatic party to all proceedings 
Granted specific authority to seek advanced court approval of transactions 
Given statutory authority for appointment of relators in such transactions 
Responsible for independent fairness review 
C. Board of Directors 
Enhanced duty of care standard applied 
Require transaction to be approved by independent committee of outside di- 
rectors 
All conflicts of interest must be disclosed and are measured by the standard of 
intrinsic fairness 
The board is responsible for maximizing value and to have an independent 
valuation and fairness opinion 
The board should provide for a fair market test whenever possible 
A written report discussing grounds for the selection of a particular offer 
215. These recommendations are derived in part from: (1) proposed guidelines prepared by the Volunteer 
Trustees Foundation for Legal Research; (2) the California Corporations Code section 5913; (3) Review Pro- 
tocol of Sale of Charitable Assets to For-Profit Entities-Review Protocol, published by the California Ofice of 
the Attorney General; and (4) proposals by Robert Boisture, Esq. and Professor Harvey Goldschmid. 
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D. Proceeds of Transaction 
Assets must be held by a section 501(c)(3) charity 
Proceeds must not be used for private benefit; conflicts of interest are prohib- 
ited 
Any new charitable entity must not be controlled by the for-profit either by 
board representation or through grantmaking 
The attorney general shall monitor charitable entity for five years after the 
creation or conversion transaction 
Assets must be utilized for health care 
Some public representation on the entity's board should exist 
Foundations over $50 million in assets must have professional management and 
the boards should receive training in trusteeship 
E. Valuation 
Duty to seek fair market value 
Detailed description of the valuation components and approaches to reaching 
price 
Competing valuation report by the attorney general or relator 
Market test when possible 
F. Legislative Action Required 
Explicit authority given to the attorney general to participate in all proceedings 
during the conversion process 
Converting party must fund use of outside experts hired by the attorney general 
Attorney's fees paid by converting party in relator actions 
Market test required before approval of offer 
Public disclosure of all material terms of the agreement 
Mandated independent fairness opinion 
Board of nonprofit required to consider short and long term impact from the 
transaction on the delivery of health care to the community 
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